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Abstract 
This paper takes an in-depth look at the current state of the local public finances 
in the Latin America region, identifies and analyzes some of the main challenges for 
improving efficiency, equity and effectiveness in the delivery of public services and it 
closes by offering a set of recommendations for policy reform 
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Local governance and the municipality have a long history and tradition in Latin 
America going back to colonial times.
2
 But it has been only after the 1980s, and for many 
countries only in the last decade, that genuine decentralization reform efforts have come 
to invigorate and enhance the role of local governments. However, despite some 
significant progress to date many challenges still remain for municipalities to play a 
vibrant and meaningful role in the delivery of public services and to contribute to 
improve the daily lives of Latin American citizens.
3
  
The general trend has been an increasing level of fiscal decentralization in the 
Latin American region over the last two decades when we measure fiscal decentralization 
as sub-national expenditures as percent of national expenditures (from on average 13 
percent in 1985 to 19 percent in 2005), or as sub-national revenues and expenditures as 
percent of GDP (from 5.5 percent in 2000 to 6.6 percent in 2007). However, there are 
significant variations in these trends across countries in the region.
4
 Overall, increased 
decentralization can be detected in the devolution of new responsibilities including the 
environment and the fight against poverty and in the increase in decentralized 
expenditures in education, health, etc.  Less progress can be detected in the devolution of 
autonomous revenue sources. 
Fiscal decentralization continues to be a dynamic process in Latin America. 
Recent times have seen a variety of innovations in the region that have attracted interest 
from all corners of the world, for example raking systems local performance in Brazil and 
Colombia, per client based transfers for health and education in Chile, or fighting poverty 
with direct transfers to families administered by municipalities in Brazil.  A good number 
of countries are embarked or considering significant reforms that that will further deepen 
and strengthen municipal autonomy.  For example, Bolivia has recently approved a new 
Constitution to allow for better representation at the sub-national level of different ethnic 
groups; Uruguay recently has introduced a third tier of government with 89 new 
                                                 
2
 See United Cities and Local Governments 2008 GOLD I report. 
3
 The effectiveness of decentralization efforts has varied considerably across countries of the Latin America 
region. In the last decade, decentralization has moved at a fast pace in countries such as Colombia and Peru 
but it continues to be stagnant after several decades of planning and legal measures in countries such as the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti. Besides Brazil and all the Spanish-speaking countries of Latin America, 
this paper covers also Haiti, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. As shorthand, all the countries will be 
addressed in this paper as Latin America.  
4
 See, for example, Daughters and Harper (2007).  
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municipalities; Costa Rica has approved also very recently the ―Ley General de 
Transferencia de Competencias y Recursos a los Municipios‖ which provides the 
possibility to transfer 10 percent of the national budget resources to the municipalities 
clearing the way for these local government to assume new competencies and improve 
the quality of services and infrastructure; or in El Salvador the association of 
municipalities (COMURES) is maintaining an active dialog with the central authorities to 
increase the funding and general stability of the general transfer system. On the other 
hand, there are countries in the region where some trends have been in the opposite 
direction and could go toward some forms of re-centralization. For example, in Argentina 
the Law of Economic Emergency of 2002 and the Budget Law of 2006  have given 
central authorities increased discretion to assign  federal funds or unilaterally interrupt 
their disbursement. In the Dominican Republic there have also been elements of 
recentralization with new Municipal Law of 2007 establishing fixed budget shares for 
different types of expenditures on personnel, services, public infrastructure, etc ; it is also 
feared that the new country constitution will lead to the general transfer fund of 10 
percent of the state budget.  Similarly, in Peru recent legislation has revoked the 
municipalities‘ prerogative to issue building licenses and rezoning of land use and the 
regular transfer funds allocated to municipalities have been significantly reduced for 
2009 to 2011. In Colombia, the central government has recently decided to directly 
allocate resources for water and sanitation that until then had been assigned to municipal 
governments (through a fiduciary fund administrated by Central Government). Finally, in 
Venezuela the municipal authorities have been denouncing the continuous curtailment of 
competencies and resources and the increasing encroachment of the central authorities in 
local matters.  
This paper takes an in-depth look at the current state of the local public finances 
in the Latin America region, identifies and analyzes some of the main challenges for 
improving efficiency, equity and effectiveness in the delivery of public services and for 
promoting development and it closes by offering a set of recommendations for policy 
reform.
5
 
                                                 
5
 The focus of this report is on fiscal decentralization. Issues of political and administrative decentralization 
for the most part are not covered in the report.  
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I. Overview of the Structure and Performance of Local Government 
Finances in the Region 
Countries in the region are highly diverse along a number of dimensions: federal 
versus unitary, size, colonial tradition, etc.. This diversity is found first among the four 
federal countries in the region: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela. Among the 
countries with a unitary system we can identify clusters of countries with more similar 
institutions and current challenges, including the Andean countries (Colombia, Ecuador, 
Peru and Bolivia), the generally smaller countries of Central America, the Island States 
with non-Iberian traditions,
6
 and what we could call the southern cone exceptions 
(Paraguay, Uruguay and especially Chile) because of their approach to fiscal 
decentralization. The diversity is also found in population size (from the 196 million of 
Brazil to the one million of Trinidad and Tobago), in real GDP per capita (from $9,357 in 
Argentina in 2007 in constant 2000 US dollars to $884 in Nicaragua and only $411 in 
Haiti), and in other dimensions.  
However, there are also many common features in the way that municipalities are 
structured and work, which enables us to treat all municipal governments in the region 
from a common perspective. An important common feature is that, for those countries 
with more than one tier of sub-national government, the relationship between the central 
government and the municipalities are for the most part directly between these two levels 
as opposed to the central government dealing exclusively with the regional and local 
governments and then these latter dealing exclusively with the municipalities.
7
  In most 
cases, the legal status of the municipalities clearly stated in the constitution or specialized 
laws, such as municipal codes. The most important exception to this rule is Argentina 
where the constitution gives the intermediate level government, the provinces, discretion 
to structure the fiscal arrangements with the municipalities.
8
 To a lesser extent the same 
                                                 
6
 Naturally, these countries are not usually classified as ―Latin‖ America.  
7
 In the technical parlance the vertical relationships between different levels of government are bifurcated 
(central to local and central to regional, separately)  as opposed to hierarchical (central to regional to local, 
all linked).. 
8
 In contrast, for example, the Brazilian Constitution defines its political system as the union of the central 
government, the states, and the municipalities, thus giving local governments an autonomous standing vis-
à-vis the intermediate level governments. 
                      Municipal Finances in Latin America: Features, Issues, and Prospects                             5        
 
5 
 
story is repeated in Mexico.
9
 Thus, the key difference explaining the different approaches 
to central-local relations is that between ‗federal‘ and ‗unitary‘ nations. But even in the 
federal cases, despite the variety of provincial-local arrangements that exist in Argentina 
and to a lesser extent in Mexico,
 10
 the issues currently facing municipal governments are 
not essentially different from those being faced by the rest of the municipalities in the 
region. For this reason, in this the report we will not make a point of identifying the 
different groups of country experiences but instead we will use a common framework for 
all countries, identifying throughout particular country experiences as lessons of what 
needs to be avoided or what may be desirable to imitate and replicate.     
The Structure of Local Governments 
 As a rule the vertical structure of government in Latin America is organized in 
three tiers of government (Table1), with the exceptions of Peru, that has four levels, and 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago that have two levels
11
 The focus of this paper will be 
almost exclusively on the lowest tier of government: the municipalities. The intermediate 
levels (States, provinces, regions and departments) will be referred to only in issues 
relevant to the municipalities.  
 
  
                                                 
9
 Brazilian states also have some limited role in managing the municipalities. 
10
 Note also that the status of the capital city of Buenos Aires is defined separately in the Constitution. 
 
11
 In the case of Bolivia, the provincial level may not be interpreted as an additional autonomous level. 
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Table 1: Decentralization in Latin America: Political and Territorial Organization 
(2007) 
 
           
Country 
Levels 
of gov. 
(#) 
Govt. level names 
Interm
ediate 
Level 
(level 
2) 
Local 
level 
(Level 
3) 
Level 
4 
Average 
Population 
Level 2 
Average 
Populati
on Level 
3 
Populatio
n in the 
largest 
city 
(% of 
urban 
populatio
n) 
Populat
ion in 
urban 
agglome
rations 
> 1 
million 
(% of 
total 
populat
ion) 
GDP 
per 
capita 
(curren
t US$) 
Argentina 3 federal, provincial, 
municipality/department 
24 1638  1,686,750 24,714 35 39 6644 
Bolivia 4 national, department, 
municipality/canton 
9 327 * 1,027,535 28,280* 26 32 1379 
Brazil 3 federal, state, municipal 27 5564  7,271,948 35,288 12 38 6855 
Chile 3 national, region, 
municipality 
(15) 345  1,096,943 47,555* 39 34 9878 
Colombia 3 national, department, 
municipality 
32 1102  1,422,401 39,927 25 28.8 4724 
Costa Rica 3 national, canton (7) 81        599,416    51,801  .. 35 10800 
Dominican 
Republic 
3 national, province, 
municipality 
(32) 229  297,098 61,237 32 22 3772 
Ecuador 3 national, province, 
canton 
22 215  633,075 64,780 29 32 3335 
El Salvador 3 national, department, 
municipality 
(14) 262  504,743 26,971 35 21 2973 
Guatemala 3 national, department, 
municipality 
(22) 333  591,009 39,046 16 8 2536 
Haiti 3 national, department, 
commune 
10 140  892,455 ---- 46 21 699 
Honduras 3 national, department, 
municipality 
(18) 298  424,407 25,635 .. .. 1722 
Jamaica 2 national, parish  14  200,309  .. .. 4272 
Mexico 3 national, state, 
municipality 
32 2454  3,436,106 44,807 10  14400 
Nicaragua 3 national, department, 
municipality (+  2 special 
regions) 
(17) 153  340,344 37,816 .. .. 1022 
Panama 3 national, 
province/comarca, 
district 
14 75  236,406 44,129 53 38 5833 
Paraguay 3 national, department, 
canton 
18 227  379,517 30,094 51 31 1997 
Peru 3 national, region/special 
province, 
province/district 
26 1834  1,122,342 15,911 40 29 3846 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
2 national, 
region/borough/city 
 16  65,460  .. .. 15668 
Uruguay 2 national, department 
(municipality) 
19 89**  183,041 39,076 49 45 6960 
Venezuela 3 national, state, 
municipality 
24 335  1,100,617 78,850 12 32 8299 
Note: #computed using the number of jurisdictions in level. Between brackets when the authorities are not 
elected. In Peru are two kinds of municipalities: provincials and districts.  
 *In Bolivia there are departments, provinces (not elected authorities: 112), municipalities and 
territories of traditional peoples ―territorios indígneas originarios campesinos‖ (incorporated in the 
new constitution) 
** In Uruguay, the municipalities that have been in the constitution were last year.  
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As of 2010, there were over 16,000 municipal governments in Latin America. 
Their number by country obviously varies with population size and territory, with Brazil 
counting 5,564 municipalities and at the other extreme and Trinidad and Tobago with 16 
municipalities.  Local governments vary quite considerably in size in each country (Table 
1).  
Even though a significant share of the population of Latin American countries live 
in the largest city in the country (for example, 53% in Panama, 49% in Uruguay, 40 % in 
Peru, and 35 % in Argentina), the majority of municipalities in the region remain, for the 
most part, small in size and of a rural nature. For example, in Peru over 200 
municipalities have populations under 1,000 inhabitants, and over 50 percent of the all 
municipalities have fewer than 5,000 inhabitants. Thus the region faces challenges at the 
two extremes: massive metropolises with high levels of population density, congestion 
and rings of urban poverty; and very small municipalities in rural areas with low density, 
with low administrative capacity and lacking an appropriate scale for the provision of 
many basic public services.
12
    
In many Latin American countries the structure of local governments continues to 
be work in progress.
13
 For example, for the case of Bolivia, the new 2009 Constitution 
declares autonomous governments at the regional, municipal and indigenous community 
level, with the characteristic that the indigenous communities may fit in one or more 
municipalities or regions. The legal norms regulating this structure have not been enacted 
yet. The proliferation of new local governments, almost always through the 
fragmentation of existing ones, continues to be quite common in the region. For example 
in the Dominican Republic, between 1995 and 2006 the number of municipalities rose 
from 108 to 154.
14
 
 
                                                 
12
 An additional complication is that many municipalities in the region are a mix of urban and rural (and 
peri-urban) areas that have very different service needs.  
13
 This progress has not been lineal either, but rather characterized in many cases by politically driven 
episodes of de-centralization and re-centralization. See, for example, Smoke et al. (2006). 
14
 A recent law in that country has imposed stricter requirements for new potential municipalities requiring 
that they have 15,000 residents and be able to generate at least 10 percent of the revenue that their previous 
municipality was raising. 
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Local Expenditures and the Assignment of Competencies  
The scope of local government expenditures: The local government share in total 
public expenditures and in GDP differs significantly by country but they are generally 
lower than those observed in other regions of the world. However, as shown in Table 2, 
the share of the public sector in GDP as measured by total expenditures of the general 
government is rather high, and at levels above those of other countries in the world at 
similar levels of per capita income. This contrast of relatively smaller local government 
sectors in otherwise relatively larger overall public sectors may be explained first, by 
fewer functional expenditure responsibilities being assigned to local governments in 
comparison with other regions of the world, and second, by relatively lower levels of 
expenditure and service provision in those expenditure responsibilities actually assigned 
to local governments, as discussed below.     
As shown in Table 2, there are large differences in the share of local governments 
in total public expenditures and their relative importance in GDP. Among the most 
decentralized countries, as measured by the municipal share in total public expenditures 
are: Ecuador, , Brazil and Colombia around 20 percent, follow by Peru and Bolivia 
around 16 percent. Two large federal countries, Argentina and Mexico stand at 6.8 
percent and 5.7 percent, respectively. At the low end we find unitary countries that are 
still highly centralized such as many Centro-American and Caribbean countries (from 7% 
in Salvador, to 1,7% in Panama and Jamaica and between them Dominican Republic, 
Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica)).  
Perhaps a more meaningful measure of the role of local governments as providers 
of public services is the share of local expenditures in overall GDP (Table 2). This 
variable measures the percentage of national resources channelled through local 
governments. From this perspective, Brazil at 7.7 percent and Bolivia at 7.0 percent and 
Ecuador at 5.1 percent are currently the most municipally decentralized countries in the 
region, while Peru, Colombia, and Argentina account for between 2 and 3 percent of 
GDP. At the bottom stand more centralized countries: Dominican Republic, Panama, El 
Salvador and Jamaica, with less than 0.9 percent of GDP.  
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Table 2: Public Finance Indicators 
Country 
Total 
Expenditure 
in general 
govt.    (Mill 
USD)  
Total 
Expenditure 
in general 
govt. (% of 
GDP)  
Local 
Expenditure   
(Mill USD)  
Local 
Expenditure 
(% of GDP)  
Local 
Expenditure 
% of 
General 
Government  
Argentina(2006) 44,390.00  30.8  3,107.30  2.2  6.8  
Bolivia(2008) 5,503.00  42  880.48  7  16  
Brazil(2007) 601,405.00  34.9  112,331.59  7.7  18.7  
Chile(2007) 25,995.00  15.2  3,119.40  2  12.8  
Colombia(2006) 48,406.00  14.2  10,165.26  2.7  18.7  
Costa Rica(2008) 58,982.30  38  na  na  na  
Dominican 
Republic(2006) 7,612.00  16  403.00  0.9  5.3  
Ecuador(2007) 10,357.00  21.6  2,423.00  5.1  23.3  
El Salvador(2007) 3,710.00  18.2  107.90  0.5  3  
Guatemala(2002)
1
  5,174.00  14.5  na  na  na  
Haiti(2004) 802  15  na  na  na  
Honduras(2004) 1,982.80  22.4  195.00  2.2  9.8  
Jamaica(2008) 4,261.00  38  73.00  0.7  1.7  
Mexico(2007) 327,973.00  28.7  19,678.38  1.6  5.7  
Nicaragua(2002) 1,304.50  23.3  na  na  na  
Panama(2005) 6,855.20  44.9  137.10  0.8  1.7  
Paraguay(2006)
2
 5,290.80  37.1  423.26  0.3  8  
Peru(2007) 16,904.00  16  2,774.00  2.6  16.4  
Trinidad and 
Tobago(1995) 8,600.00  34.8  0.00  5.2  14.8  
Uruguay(2007) 8,611.00  30.8  0.00  na  na  
Venezuela(2007) 58,888.00  25.7  na  na  na  
Notes:  
1 
central government only 
2 
Data from financial statements. Local data partial (only 33% of all Municipalities included)
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The assignment of expenditure competencies:  Several features characterize 
expenditure assignments in Latin American countries. First, with the exception of 
Argentina,
 15
 all countries have explicit assignments for municipalities in the national 
laws. In most countries, as shown in Table 3, the expenditure assignments are defined in 
the country‘s Constitution; otherwise, the assignments are specified in special laws, most 
commonly some form of municipal code.
16
 Often, in these formal assignments, 
municipalities are allowed to provide any services not specifically assigned to any other 
level of government.
17
 The use of the constitution for determining expenditure 
assignments can be understood as a sign of status and guarantee for municipal 
governments, but generally using the constitution for these purposes can also create 
problems because of the difficulty of adding sufficient detail on assignments and the 
difficulties of changing and updating assignments in response to frequently evolving 
conditions. 
Second, there are enormous variations in the assignment of responsibilities to 
municipalities; the assignments represent a mosaic of approaches, which as shown in 
Annex 1 defy generalization.  Most countries provide for a set of obligatory functions, 
often exclusively assigned to municipalities (as opposed to shared responsibilities with 
other levels of government). These range from basic urban services such as garbage 
collection, road maintenance, parks, market stalls and slaughter houses, and so on, as well 
as some administrative functions such as, civil registry, land planning and housing 
permits. In addition, most countries also provide for voluntary functions, which often are 
co-shared with other levels of government. These may include some social services, such 
as basic education and primary health services, and public utilities, such as water and 
                                                 
15
 In Argentina, each province regulates the expenditure responsibilities of municipalities differently. The 
provinces, in general, tend to enumerate a set of general functions accompanied by a clause that may be 
used to expand local competencies. Much less frequently the provinces explicitly enumerate the functions 
that municipalities must fulfil or functions exclusively assigned to them. 
16
 There are some qualified exceptions to the rule. For example, in the case of Colombia there is no special 
law assigning expenditure responsibilities at different levels of government, but there are several laws (60 
of 1993 and 715 of 2001) that specify certain norms regarding the assignment of competencies.  
17
 A clear exception to this rule is Chile, where municipalities are circumscribed to a closed list of 
functions. But unlike the behavior of sub-national governments in other regions of the world showing 
eagerness to expand their functional responsibilities, the norm in Latin American countries appears to be 
that of little venturing beyond those responsibilities listed in the laws, with perhaps the exception in some 
countries (for example Brazil and Mexico) in the area of local economic development.    
2                                               International Studies Program Working Paper Series 
sewerage services. But as can be seen in Table 3, in some countries (Colombia, 
Guatemala, Jamaica) basic education and primary health can also be designated as 
obligatory and exclusive responsibilities of local governments
18
.  
Third, fundamental redistributive social welfare services (such as social security, 
unemployment compensation, and welfare payments) must be the responsibility of the 
central level. However, in some countries (for example, Bolivia and Chile) the central 
governments, while retaining the obligation of financing those services, have delegated to 
local governments the implementation and management of several important social 
welfare programs (e.g., family welfare services) in order to exploit the advantage of 
proximity and better information local governments that have.
19
  Municipal governments 
in many Latin American countries play a large role in public investment in infrastructure 
at the sub-national level often as equal partners with upper level governments in patterns 
similar to those observed in European countries.
20
 For example, in Brazil local 
governments in recent years have undertaken close to 45 percent of all public sector 
investment.  
 Finally, many countries in Latin America have concurrent or shared expenditure 
responsibilities, which generally result in less clarity and more potential conflict than 
exclusive assignments. There is, however, no clear correlation between the dominance of 
concurrent responsibilities and the degree of municipal decentralization. Bolivia, Brazil, 
Mexico and Venezuela have considerable co-shared responsibilities, but the first two 
have a relatively high degree of municipal decentralization, while the latter two 
(especially Venezuela), have among the lowest degree of municipal decentralization. Nor 
is there a correlation between the prevalence of exclusive functional assignments and the 
level of municipal decentralization. Of course, in some cases, such as the Dominican 
Republic, Honduras, and Uruguay, most functional responsibilities are still assigned 
exclusively to the central government. In other countries, such as Colombia, Peru, El 
Salvador, Guatemala and Jamaica, there is a nontrivial degree of exclusive 
                                                 
18
 In El Salvador basic education and primary health are assigned to the local level, but actual service 
delivery works through special local mechanisms administrated jointly by the State, the communities and 
the private sector. 
19
 On the whole these experiences appear to have been positive (Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico and Peru).In the 
case of Mexico some programs have been critiqued because of partisan interference by central authorities 
in the deployment of funds.  
20
 The budget figures are discussed further below. 
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responsibilities.  In the first two, however, there is a relatively high level of municipal 
decentralization, while the latter three have relatively low levels.         
Revenue Assignments  
Practically all countries of Latin America assign certain taxes to local 
governments; some exceptions are El Salvador, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. As 
shown in Table 3, the most commonly assigned tax is the property tax, although it is 
named differently and varies somewhat in scope across countries.
21
  Other local taxes 
include betterment levies, car registration and car permits, real estate and land transfers, 
different forms of business licences,
22
 taxes on gambling and, in a few some form of sales 
taxes or business tax based on sales countries ).
23
 Practically all local governments are 
allowed to charge fees and charges for particular public services such as building 
licenses, refuse collection, public utilities, slaughter houses, and public markets and 
others.  
 
Table 3: Assignment of Taxes and Fees to Local Governments in Latin America 
    
Country 
Type of tax Type of Fees 
Property Others  
    
Argentina urban/rural property (and its 
increased value b/c of public 
investment) 
car registration, turnover tax public utilities, 
fines 
    
Bolivia urban/rural property car registration, car/property 
transfers, slaughterhouse, 
construction 
 
    
Brazil urban property (including 
increased value due to 
infrastructure improvement)  
 
tax on service sector (ISS), 
registered goods tax, real estate 
transaction tax 
fines, public 
utilities 
    
Chile urban property car registration, alcohol public utilities, 
fines, permits 
    
                                                 
21
 Of significant importance is that just a handful of countries allow for the taxation of both urban and rural 
property. Those countries allowing only the taxation of urban property leave rural municipalities in a 
relative disadvantage. Note also that the property tax is still assigned to the central government in El 
Salvador and that there appears to be no property tax in the Dominican Republic, only a property transfer 
tax. 
22
  A good example is the  ―patente municipal‖ in Chile which is paid annually at rate based on  the 
declared own capital assets. This tax is further discussed in the next section. 
23
 In the cases of Brazil‘s ISS (tax on services ) and Colombia‘s ICA (tax on trade and industry) municipal 
collections exceed those from the property tax (IBI, impuesto sobre bienes inmuebles). The two country 
experiences with these taxes are also further discussed in the next section.  
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Colombia urban property (and its 
increased value b/c of public 
investment) 
surtax on gasoline, tax on 
industry/commerce, mineral 
extraction, slaughterhouse, 
gambling 
public utilities, 
fines 
    
Costa Rica urban property  public utilities 
Dominican 
Republic 
   
    
Ecuador urban/rural (and its increased 
value b/c of public 
infrastructure investment) 
car tags, permits (business, 
construction),  
fines, utilities 
    
El Salvador  Specific taxes for each 
municipality based on congress 
approval such as business taxes on 
industrial, trade, and financial 
activities 
fines, public 
utilities, fees for 
services 
rendered 
    
Guatemala urban property
1
 tax on wages, advertising 
(banners), extraction of 
products/economic activity, 
alcohol 
 
    
Haiti    
    
Honduras urban/rural property (and its 
increased value b/c of public 
investment) 
turnover tax on industry and trade, 
extraction of natural resources 
(fishing, minerals, oil), cattle 
slaughter 
public utilities, 
firefighters, 
fines 
    
Jamaica  Parochial revenue fund   
    
Mexico Urban property Car registration (all other taxes are 
centralized) 
Varies by state  
    
Nicaragua Urban/Rural property Sales tax (recently eliminated); 
patents and business licenses  
fines, public 
utilities 
    
Panama tax on unused land 
(urban/rural) 
tax on alcohol, economic activity 
and vehicles  
fines, fees (cattle 
slaughter) 
    
Paraguay urban property (and its 
increased value b/c of public 
investment) 
car registration, games/gambling, 
wealth tax (corporate), land 
transfers/subdivision 
public utilities 
    
Peru urban/rural property car registration, car/property 
transfers, construction 
public utilities, 
fees, fines 
    
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
   
    
Uruguay urban property (and its 
increased value b/c of public 
investment) 
car registration, gambling, shows fines, fees for 
services 
    
Venezuela urban/rural property car tags, gambling, economic 
activity,  
fines, fees for 
permits 
    
 
Notes: 
1
 Tax collection authority is only given to local governments that prove to have the capacity to collect the 
tax  
2
 Argentina: Not all provinces have delegated property taxes to their municipalities  
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3
 Brazil: The ISS is assessed and collected by the municipality at rates set by the municipality but subject to 
a maximum fixed by federal law 
 
Revenue assignments are formalized in different ways. In many cases, the 
assignments are specified in the general tax laws or in the special municipal laws.  In 
other cases, they are established in the national constitution, as for example in Brazil. In 
some other cases, the constitution delegates to the intermediate level of government, 
provinces or states, discretion to determine local revenue assignments, such as in the case 
of Argentina and Mexico, which results in a variety of de facto assignments.
24
 
The level of autonomy granted to local governments also varies. As summarized 
in Table 4 most countries use a ―closed list‖ approach and do not allow the introduction 
of new taxes to local governments; some exceptions include Ecuador and Uruguay.
25
   On 
the other hand, about two-thirds of the countries in the region allow local governments 
the ability to set the rates of some taxes; this practice is widely accepted as the most 
desirable form of tax autonomy that can be granted to local governments.
26
 It is 
interesting that countries such as Bolivia and Peru, where decentralization reforms have 
advanced rapidly in recent years, still grant no discretion to set tax rates. A reduced 
number of countries in the region grant local discretion to modify tax base.
27
 Most 
countries in the region allow local government discretion in fixing the levels of fees and 
user charges for local government services. Nevertheless, an important restriction on the 
revenue autonomy of local governments is the practice followed in several countries of 
requiring local government revenue budgets (―plan de arbitrios‖) to be previously 
approved by a higher tier of government prior to the beginning of the fiscal year.
28
 As can 
                                                 
24
 In the case of Mexico, the constitution assigns the real estate taxes (and only the real state tax) to the 
municipalities. This is the only tax explicitly assigned to the municipalities.. 
25
 In Argentina, some provinces may also allow their local governments to introduce new taxes but under 
quite restrictive guidelines.  
26
 There is not a lot of information available on how this autonomy is actually used, but it would appear that 
it is quite common for local governments to adopt the lower rates authorized in the law.   
27
 Generally, this form of tax autonomy is also considered less desirable, although there may be less of a 
problem in changes in the bases of taxes with rather immobile bases such as land and buildings. But even in 
these cases the use of different bases may make more difficult the measurement of fiscal capacity across 
jurisdictions.   
28
 There are two versions of this prior approval. In one version the approval works as simple legality where 
the higher level cannot change resource allocation decisions. In the second version, the higher level can 
change decisions of the lower level. The practice in the regions seems to be more in the nature of the first 
version where approval by the higher level works more as a check that the regulatory framework is being 
followed. 
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be seen in Table4 this is still a practice in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Panama, and Paraguay; 
in Mexico this approval comes at the intermediate level from the state governments. In 
terms of fiscal administration (Table 4), the general rule is local responsibility for the 
administration of local taxes, fees and charges, although in some cases tax administration 
responsibility is shared with the central authorities.
29
 
 
Table 4: Autonomy Granted in Revenue Assignments to Local Governments and 
Responsibility for the Collection and Administration of Local Taxes and Fees 
Country 
Ability to 
introduce 
new taxes 
 
Ability to 
set tax 
rates within 
legal limits 
 
Ability to 
change tax 
base 
Control or veto 
over local govt. 
budgets by 
Central/Regional 
govt. 
Responsibility for 
the collection of: 
Fees taxes 
Argentina Yes yes Yes No L L 
Bolivia No no No Central C/R C 
Brazil Yes yes Yes No L L 
Chile No yes Yes No L L 
Colombia No yes No No L L 
Costa Rica No No No Central PS* PS* 
Dominican Republic No no No No C C 
Ecuador Yes yes No No L L 
El Salvador Yes yes No No L L 
Guatemala No yes No No L C/L 
Haiti n.a. n.a. n.a. Na na C 
Honduras  No yes No No L L 
Jamaica No yes Yes Central L C/L 
Mexico No no No Regional L L 
Nicaragua No yes Yes Central L L 
Panama No yes No Central L C/L 
Paraguay No no No Central L C/L 
Peru No no No No L L 
Trinidad and Tobago no no No No L C/L 
Uruguay yes Yes No Central L L 
Venezuela yes Yes Yes No L L 
Note *: Costa Rica collects through the private sector 
Property taxes remain the great unrealized promise for local tax autonomy in 
Latin America, a problem that is shared with other regions of the world. In most countries 
                                                 
29
 As an exception, it appears that in Bolivia all local taxes are collected and administered by the central 
authorities. 
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in the region, the yield from property tax remains far below its potential. While the 
property tax on average in recent years raises revenues of 2.12 percent of GDP in OECD 
countries, 0.68 percent in transition countries, and 0.60 percent in developing countries, 
the average in Latin America is only 0.37 percent of GDP. The reasons for low 
performance are multiple, including low political will –from the national government as 
well as from the Parliament and the local governments themselves- and the disincentive 
effects of revenue sharing and inter-governmental fiscal transfers (IGFTs), as well as 
outdated and poorly equipped tax administrations. These factors translate into generous 
exemptions and low tax rates, obsolete and infrequent property value assessments, 
incomplete registries and cadastres and a lack of willingness and means of enforcing 
collections. This lacklustre performance varies little with the different arrangements in 
the region for discretion on rate setting or administration of the property tax.
30
 
More generally, the whole range of local raised revenues from own taxes and fees 
in Latin America represent a relatively small share of total consolidated revenues in the 
public sector, although in terms of the share in local budgets these revenues are relatively 
large.
31
 Of course, there is a large variation in experience from country to country. Table 
5 shows that as percent of consolidated government revenues, local governments in 
Colombia raise 22 percent, Brazil and Peru 18 percent and Bolivia, 16 percent. At the 
lower end stand Panama with 2 percent.
32
 For Mexico this figure is 6 percent.  
However, on average, municipalities raise a higher percentage of their budgets 
from own revenues that is the case in some other regions of the world, including Africa, 
Asia and a good portion of European countries. As shown in Table 5, the percent of local 
budgets financed out of own taxes and fees is quite high, between one quarter and over 
half for many countries. 
33
However, in Bolivia this share is only 11 percent, in Brazil 20 
percent and in Mexico, 16 percent.  
 
                                                 
30
 For a discussion of the issues, see Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez (2009) and De Cesare and Lazo 
Marín (2008). 
31
 These two effects are compatible if we recall our discussion in the previous section that local government 
budgets represent a relatively small share of the general government budget.  
32
 See Annex 2 for the breakdown of revenues collected by each tier of government. In Venezuela the 
figures seems to be extremely low probably due to reporting issues; some large municipalities in Venezuela 
appear to collect property taxes and fees. 
33
 See Annexe3 in the Appendix for the breakdown of sources of revenues for local governments. 
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Table 5: Shares of Local Own Revenues (in percentages) 
Country (Most recent year) 
 
Local government 
revenues as % of 
total govt. revenues 
 
Own taxes and fees  
as % of  local 
revenues 
Local own taxes and 
fees  as % of GDP 
Argentina(2006) 7.0% 49.8% 1.2% 
Bolivia(2008) 16.0% 11.4% 2.7% 
Brazil(2007) 17.6% 20.1% 1.8% 
Chile(2007) 9.0% 63.0% 0.7% 
Colombia(2006) 22.0% 41.2% 2.1% 
Dominican Republic(2006)  58.4% 0.7% 
Ecuador(2007) 12.0% 34.6% 1.6% 
El Salvador(2007)  69.9% 0.0% 
Haiti(2004)  25.0% 0.5% 
Honduras(2004) 8.0% 58.1% 0.9% 
Jamaica(2008) 0.0% 100.0% 0.2% 
Mexico(2007) 6.0% 15.6% 2.4% 
Nicaragua(2002)  44.0% 0.6% 
Panama(2005) 2.0% 49.0% 0.3% 
Paraguay(2006) 8.0% 34.1% 1.2% 
Peru(2007) 18.0% 43.2% 2.6% 
Trinidad and Tobago(1995)  52.9% 0.1% 
Uruguay(2007)   0.0% 
Venezuela(2007) 0.0% 94.9% 0.1% 
 
Intergovernmental Transfers  
Because of the limited extent of fiscal autonomy, practically all local governments 
suffer from vertical imbalances, i.e. the expenditure needs arising from their functional 
competences exceed their ability to self finance them. Although the existence of vertical 
imbalance is not in dispute, their actual extent is generally a polemical issue because 
practically no country in the region has introduced explicit methodologies to measure the 
expenditure needs of local governments in a transparent and objective manner. In order to 
address the existing vertical imbalances, practically all countries in the region implement 
a range of fiscal transfers, often consisting of different forms of revenue sharing, an array 
of specific or conditional grants, and in some cases, equalization grants.  
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In addition to vertical imbalances, in practically all countries in the region there 
are also significant horizontal imbalances between local governments. These imbalances 
are the result of the different tax capacities and economic bases of local governments and 
also of different expenditure needs arising from differences in the costs of service 
delivery and differences in the profiles and needs of the resident populations. Horizontal 
imbalances are most pronounced between urban and rural municipalities and between 
smaller and larger urban centers. As we see below, different approaches are used in the 
region to address these horizontal imbalances. 
 The emphasis throughout the region has been on addressing the problem of 
vertical imbalances through different forms of revenue sharing with central government 
tax collections. There has been less emphasis on the design of explicit equalization 
grants, although quite often revenue sharing formulas contain equalization features. 
Conditional grants are less common in Latin America than in other regions of the world, 
but here again there are important exceptions.  
The large variety of country approaches followed, as shown in Table A.5 in the 
Appendix, makes it hard to synthesize them in a brief space.  
Nevertheless, most countries in the region use some form of general revenue 
sharing. The pool of funds is most frequently defined on the basis of central government 
general revenues or their most important sources; this is the case, for example, of Bolivia, 
Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. In 
other cases, the pool is based on specific central government taxes; for example, 20 
percent of the fees on oil production derived by the Mexican states must be passed on to 
their municipalities; Nicaragua‘s additional tax sharing with the municipalities is based 
on revenues from natural resources; and in Peru, some of the tax sharing is from a share 
of the sales taxes and from gas and oil extraction proceeds (canon, sobrecanon, and 
canon petrolero). In these latter cases, actual transfers can be subject to considerable 
fluctuations, for example, depending on international price levels for natural resources.  
In some cases, shared revenues are distributed on a derivation (i.e. origin) basis, 
for example, the canon, sobrecanon, and canon petrolero in Peru. This approach (sharing 
revenues from natural resources on a derivation basis) has become a significant factor 
adding up to regional horizontal fiscal imbalances. Most often some sort of formula is 
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used for the distribution of resources that includes several variables, some of which, as 
noted above, may have equalizing features.
34
 For example, in Bolivia revenue sharing is 
based solely on population; in Ecuador it is according to population and relative poverty 
levels; in El Salvador it is according to population, ‗equity‘ (a fixed amount for each 
municipality), poverty, and land surface area; in Guatemala it is distributed according to a 
formula that includes equal shares (fixed amounts), population, number of settlements, 
and per capita income; in Honduras it is according to population and equal amounts for 
all municipalities; in Nicaragua it is according to population and several other criteria; 
and in Peru it is according to population and infant mortality rates. Frequently, the 
formulas are also employed by central governments to pursue several objectives other 
than equalization. For example, in Ecuador the sharing formula includes elements for 
rewarding administrative effort and achieving goals in the national development plan, 
while in Nicaragua the formula provides incentives for increasing revenues from property 
tax and for achieving more effective budget execution. 
Some countries allow unconditional use of shared revenue, including Bolivia, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, and Honduras.  But in other cases the use of funds is conditional. 
For example, in Colombia the use of revenue sharing funds is earmarked for basic 
education, health, and water and sewerage; in Guatemala, for education, health and 
infrastructure; in Nicaragua and Paraguay, a share of the funds --80 percent in the latter 
case-- must be spent on infrastructure investment.  
Revenue sharing practices in the federal countries have some similarities with 
those of unitary countries, but there are also some different features. In Argentina, tax 
sharing with local governments is carried out exclusively by the provincial governments, 
which can decide how to distribute their share of federal VAT and income taxes. The 
Brazilian states also have a tax sharing system funded with 25 percent of their regional 
VAT revenues, which is distributed 75 percent on a derivation basis according to value 
added in the municipalities and 25 percent by a formula based on population, land area 
and others. This same formula is used to distribute federal tax sharing with the states 
                                                 
34
 In some cases, like in Paraguay, the allocation of funds is still ad-hoc at the discretion of the central 
authorities. In this context it is worth mentioning that there used to be more widespread ad hoc allocation of 
funds in the region, but now most countries, with limited exceptions, have moved to the better practice of 
formula based determination of the pool of funds. 
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(cooperation funds) to the municipalities. In Mexico, the states are required to distribute 
to their municipalities at least 20 percent of the income that they receive from revenue 
sharing in the federal funds (Fondo de Fiscalización and Fondo General de 
participaciones). Mexico also has a federal grant, amounting to 1 percent of federal 
collections (Fondo de Fomento Municipal) that is (distributed on the basis of municipal 
revenue collections. In Venezuela, 25 percent of tax revenues from hydrocarbons and 
mining are earmarked for use in health, education and housing and distributed to 
municipalities largely on a mix of the derivation principle and population size; in 
addition, in Venezuela 15 percent of VAT revenues are distributed to municipalities on 
the basis of population, poverty, and land area and earmarked for local infrastructure.  
Conditional or specific transfers are less extensively used in Latin American than 
in other regions of the world.
35
  Nevertheless their use is increasing, especially in those 
countries where central governments count on being associated with local governments 
as partners for the delivery of certain services and the implementation of national 
programs.
36
 For example, Bolivia has introduced a conditional health transfer for a 
national program in support of infants and mothers (seguro materno infantil). In Brazil, 
several conditional grants have been introduced for public transport (funded by the 
sharing of federal fuel levies), for basic education, and for health services, including 
hospitals from the national health system. In Chile several highly conditional grants have 
for many years funded local governments‘ activities in education, health, and other social 
programs.  Some conditional grants are earmarked for certain geographical areas that are 
deemed to be lagging behind. For example, in Ecuador there is a conditional capital 
investment grant for the Amazon region.
37
  
                                                 
35
 Here we are referring in a conventional way to specific funds assigned to particular objectives and 
administered separately by central government agencies. This is interpreted as being different from the 
conditioning or earmarking of revenue sharing funds. As we have seen above, a number of countries in the 
region condition the use of revenue sharing funds to investment in infrastructure and so on. If the 
restrictions in the use of revenue sharing funds were included in the general category of conditional 
transfers then the practices in the regions would not be that different from those in other regions of the 
world.   
36
 In a traditional way experienced in other regions of the world, the rise of conditional transfers has been 
more to assist the center in better implementing its programs and less in providing incentives to local 
governments to improve local functions. 
37
 This is a specific instance of larger developmental goals that can be addressed by conditional transfers, 
such as arid areas, poor areas, unexploited high potential areas, etc. 
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A particular subgroup of conditional grants is earmarked for investment in local 
infrastructure. For example, El Salvador offers grants for municipal capital infrastructure 
based on the presentation of project proposals. In Guatemala one-eighth of VAT revenues 
are earmarked for infrastructure in social and basic services while a share of vehicle taxes 
is earmarked for maintenance and improvements of roads and drainage. In Mexico, at 
least 20% of the investment grants (Fondo de Compensación) from the federal 
government must be assigned to the poorest ten states in the country and used by the 
municipalities of those states.   
The practice of explicitly addressing horizontal disparities among local 
governments through equalization transfers is still not common but it is taking hold in the 
region. One reason for the slow introduction of explicit equalization grants is that quite 
often revenue sharing schemes do incorporate some equalization elements in their 
allocation formulas. Several examples of existing equalization grants (above and beyond 
revenue sharing schemes with some equalizing elements in their formulas) are worth 
mentioning. One is Bolivia‘s HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative) transfers 
started in 1997 with funds from international organizations (the World Bank and the 
IMF) and distributed by the central government to local governments using a formula 
based on the poverty level and population of municipalities. In Brazil, there is a federal 
equalization transfer to the municipalities funded with a share of federal VAT and 
income tax revenues; the fund is split into two parts, with 10 percent going to state capital 
municipalities (distributed according to population and the inverse of per capita income) 
and the other 90 percent to the rest of the municipalities (distributed according to an 
index that favours municipalities with smaller populations). An interesting approach is 
that of Chile, where the formula driven equalization grant (the Common Municipal Fund) 
is funded by the municipalities‘ own revenues from different sources in what is known in 
the technical parlance as a ―fraternal‖ (or Robin Hood) system, in which the relatively 
richer municipalities finance the transferred amounts to the poorer municipalities. The 
allocation formula includes population size, poverty levels, exempted real estate property, 
and past revenue collections. One key positive feature in all these examples is the 
recognition of the need to introduce a separate instrument (equalization grants) to address 
the separate objective of horizontal inequalities arising from different expenditure needs 
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and fiscal capacity.
38
 A key common challenge ahead is the need to improve the 
methodologies used to quantify the expenditures needs and fiscal capacity of the different 
local governments. 
39
 
Borrowing  
Given their expenditure responsibilities, most municipalities have a need for long-
term finance for capital infrastructure. Local borrowing can be considered a legitimate, 
efficient, and equitable source for financing this local infrastructure. However, it is also 
widely accepted that the process of local borrowing must be subject to explicit rules and 
limitations in order to ensure fiscally responsible behavior by local officials and to 
guarantee macroeconomic stability in the country.
40
 Commonly applied rules include 
those about expected behavior, such as the ―golden rule‖ that long-term borrowed funds 
must be used for capital infrastructure only, and not for recurrent expenditures, and 
different quantitative budgetary limits on borrowing. Among the latter, there are rules on 
non-negative current budget balances, limits on the level of total debt and debt-service 
payments as a percent of budget revenues, as well as restrictions on borrowing abroad.  
 
  
                                                 
38
 The use of a fraternal system to fund the equalization transfers in Chile is also a promising innovation. 
This is a system common to a good number of European countries but it is uncertain how easily it will be 
adopted by other countries in the region.   
39
 For the available methodologies used in other regions of the world see, for example, Martinez-Vazquez 
and Searle (2007). 
40
 Historically this was not always widely accepted in some countries in the region, which in past decades 
saw an accumulation of macroeconomic difficulties associated with unfettered sub-national borrowing in 
some of the federations and politicized government-run municipal development banks. 
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Table 6: Authority to Borrow by Local Governments in Latin America 
Country Access to Financial Markets Municipal Bank Limitations 
Argentina Y Y Y 
Bolivia Y N Y 
Brazil Y N Y 
Chile N N n.a 
Colombia Y n.a Y 
Costa Rica Y n.a n.a 
Dominican Republic N Y Y 
Ecuador N N Y 
El Salvador N Y Y 
Guatemala Y n.a Y 
Haiti n.a n.a n.a 
Honduras Y Y Y 
Jamaica N N Y 
Mexico Y N Y 
Nicaragua Y n.a Y 
Panama n.a n.a n.a 
Paraguay Y N n.a 
Peru Y N Y 
Trinidad and Tobago N N n.a 
Uruguay Y N Y 
Venezuela Y Y na 
  
For a variety of reasons, ranging from fiscal conservatism to negative past 
experience, not all countries in the world allow their local governments to borrow. Yet in 
the case of Latin America, as shown in Table 6, most countries do allow local 
governments to borrow.
41
 Practically all countries allow such borrowing even though 
they impose rules and limitations on local borrowing similar to the above-mentioned 
international ‗good practice‘ guidelines. In most cases, foreign borrowing is not allowed, 
in some cases it is allowed with permission of the higher authorities, and in other cases 
even domestic borrowing requires administrative approval by higher level authorities.
42
 
Over time, national systems have adapted to particular idiosyncrasies and approaches. 
                                                 
41
 The exceptions include Chile, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ecuador, Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago.  
42
 For example, foreign borrowing by the municipalities in Argentina requires administrative approval at 
the provincial level and by the Ministry of Economy at the national level, which it has been argued has 
been subject to political criteria beyond technical aspects. .  
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For example, in Nicaragua, municipalities are able to contract short or medium term 
loans from public and private banks for public works, with long-term loans for large-
scale public works approved by the National Assembly. Loans must be repaid within the 
term of the elected officials, as mayors and municipal councils may not leave debts to 
their successors, except for long-term loans approved by the National Assembly. In the 
case of Colombia, law 358 of 1997 introduced a system of ―semáforos‖ (streetlights) 
restricting the level of local debt according to the ability to pay by the local units; if 
interest payments are below 40 percent of the operational surplus and if the debt level is 
under 80 percent of current revenues, local governments are free to borrow according to 
the law; however, they require permission to borrow from the Ministry of Finance if any 
of those limits is exceeded. With law 819, which came into effect in 2003, the necessity 
to have a primary surplus sufficient to cover the repayments and interest was added to the 
existing indicators. The three indicators must be positive in every year of the loan, and 
this must be reflected in the medium term fiscal framework of the municipality or 
department. In El Salvador, municipalities are able to borrow from commercial banks 
once they receive the proper quality ranking from the Ministry of Finance and the semi-
official organization charged with the physical distribution of the general transfer funds 
to the municipalities establishes an intercept agreement for those transfers to work as 
collateral for the loans from the commercial banks. As in other countries around the 
world, it is common to impose limits on annual debt service as percent of revenues (for 
example 20 percent in Argentina and Bolivia or 40 percent in Ecuador) and/or the total 
stock of debt as percent of total revenues (120 percent in Brazil or under 100 percent in 
Ecuador and Peru.)                                                                                                                                                             
The actual amount of sub-national debt, which includes local and provincial/state 
debt, is quite low in most countries, with the exception of Brazil and Argentina, where 
sub-national debt represents in recent times between 10 and 15 percent of GDP; Mexico, 
Colombia and Bolivia come behind with sub-national government debt representing less 
than 2 percent of GDP as of 2007.  However, for municipal governments alone in recent 
years, Bolivia is first in debt service (interest and repayment of principal) as percent of 
total municipal expenditures at around 9 percent, followed by Ecuador at around 8 
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percent. For Argentinean and Brazilian municipalities, debt service as percent of total 
municipal expenditures is round 4 percent.
43
   
Budgeting  
 The budgeting process at the local level in most Latin American countries is still 
carried out along traditional lines with heavy emphasis on incremental budgeting and ex-
ante and financial audit controls for the disbursement of funds. Much less attention is 
given to the planning of expenditure programs and ex-post evaluation of the effectiveness 
of funds disbursed on programmatic goals.
44
  One positive aspect is that almost without 
exception, local budgets need to be approved by democratically elected local councils. 
However, as we have seen above, in a significant number of countries (Bolivia, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay) at least 
some components of the local budgets need to be approved ex-ante by some higher level 
authorities at the central or regional levels. It is questionable whether or not these 
approvals are really needed; international best practice is to rely on horizontal 
accountability mechanisms ex-ante, and on the ex-post audit and to grant full budgetary 
autonomy to local governments.
45
 
―Participatory budgeting‖ is an area of innovation in several countries in the 
region that has attracted much international attention. The specific meaning of this term 
varies among those countries that have introduced this type of reform, but it generally 
means additional mechanisms for citizens to influence local budgetary decisions beyond 
the conventional vehicle of representative democracy through the democratic elections of 
municipal councilors.
46
  For example, in Bolivia a 1994 law established a mechanism of 
citizen participation in the local budget process through citizen committees (comités de 
vigilancia) and community-based organizations (OTBs—organizaciones de base), that 
                                                 
43
 See Porto (2009). 
44
 The strong emphasis on ex-ante treasury controls has not, on the other hand, reduced corruption, which, 
with some exceptions, still appears to be extensive among local governments (and the rest of the public 
sector) in the region. The difficulties lie more in poor execution of the ex-ante controls than in a deficient 
design.  
 
45
 In some cases controls for checking the legality of actions, as opposed to changing budget allocation 
decisions, can be justified when horizontal accountability and audit mechanisms are deficient or not present 
at all.  
46
 Somewhat related, citizen participation mechanisms such as referendums, ―popular initiatives,‖ and 
elected representative recalls have been operating in other regions of the world. 
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are social organizations of peasant communities, indigenous population, and 
neighbourhood groups. Citizen participation at the local level is also important in Brazil, 
but what participation actually entails varies considerably across states and even 
municipalities. In Brazil the participatory budgeting process has been accompanied by a 
great variety of experiments; in some cases groups of citizens are empowered to address 
social and political inequalities by influencing the allocation of budget resources through 
neighbourhood meetings.
47
 Other countries in the region, including some provinces in 
Argentina, have formally adopted participatory budgeting. So far there are accounts of 
specific local government successes in Brazil and elsewhere of increasing ordinary 
citizen input and preferences in budget decisions.
48
 On the other hand, participatory 
budgeting is appropriate for certain elements of the budget; thus, even in Porto Alegre 
(Brazil) the share of the budget subject to this process is limited. Other countries in the 
region have formally adopted participative budgeting. Nevertheless, the implementation 
of participative budgeting often depends on the will of the Mayor and the City Council as 
it is not a compulsory or permanent tool.   
As for the composition of municipal budgets, data availability varies significantly 
across countries and our discussion is based on a small number of countries. In terms of 
the economic classification of local expenditures, the high share of capital infrastructure 
expenditures in the municipal budgets of a significant number of countries is notable 
(Table 7). For example, in both Chile and Ecuador, local governments spend 55 percent 
of their budgets on capital expenditures; in Guatemala this figure is 64 percent and in 
Peru, 58 percent. Of course, there are large variations for these figures across countries, 
and these variations have a lot to do with the assignment of expenditure responsibilities—
what tier of government is responsible for capital infrastructure in the different areas of 
responsibility: schools, roads, etc –, and also with the legal restrictions imposed on local 
governments for how they can spend revenue sharing and other types of funds—for 
example, in Peru, local governments only can spend funds from the canon and 
sobrecanon from natural resources on capital investments. There is also the possibility 
                                                 
47
 See Afonso (2006). 
48
 For a positive assessment in the case of Bolivia, see Faguet (2004).  See also Goldfrank (2006) and Shah 
(2007) for general assessments.  
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that capital expenditures are over reported.
49
 But whatever the explanation, it is clear that 
many local governments in Latin America have been given an important role to play in 
the task of providing much needed infrastructure. This highlights the importance of 
finding more stable and potent instruments for infrastructure finance. 
 
Table 7: Budget Expenditure by Economic Classification of Local Governments 
Country  
(Most recent year) 
Wages and 
Salaries/ Pension 
funds (% of 
total) 
 
Current 
expenditure other 
than wages and 
salaries 
(% of total) 
 
Capital Expenditure/ 
debt/equipment 
(% of total) 
Argentina(2006) 47.40% 29.27% 23.33% 
Bolivia(2008) 65.80% 26.90% 7.30% 
Brazil(2007) 46.74% 53.05% 0.21% 
Chile(2007) 29.11% 15.66% 55.23% 
Colombia(2006) 74.05% 1.96% 23.98% 
Ecuador(2007) 23.60% 20.80% 55.60% 
El Salvador(2007) 45.61% 39.78% 14.60% 
Guatemala(2002) 0.00% 36.00% 64.00% 
Honduras(2004) 30.42% 19.03% 50.55% 
Mexico(2007) 82.83% 12.29% 4.88% 
Nicaragua(2002) 23.08% 38.46% 38.46% 
Panama(2005) 41.68% 55.24% 3.08% 
Paraguay(2006) 71.99% 10.94% 17.07% 
Peru(2007) 11.73% 30.31% 57.95% 
Venezuela(2007) 33.22% 33.31% 33.47% 
 
As we have seen, the movement toward open and participatory budgeting is 
spreading in the region increasing budget efficiency and accountability in general. 
Although participatory budgeting is not directly about decentralization itself, the 
movement toward participatory budgeting has tended to reinforce decentralized 
institutions. There are, however, exceptions; for example, in the Dominican Republic, 
                                                 
49
 There are incentives in many countries in the region to report some current expenditure as capital 
expenditure. For example, in some cases central legislation restricts the share of budgets that can go to 
recurrent purposes.  In other cases, practically all kinds of current expenditures have been demonized as 
being inefficient so local authorities actually report some current expenditure as actually being some form 
of capital expenditure. But, fortunately there does not appear to be a problem in Latin America with the off-
budget programs and expenditures that are common in other regions of the world, for example Africa and 
Asia.  
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Law 176 of 2007 goes a long way to introduce participatory budgeting but the actual 
level of decentralization to local governments in that country remains quite weak. 
Even less data is available to obtain a panoramic view of the functional 
classification of local budgets in the region; even for those countries for which  data are 
available for individual municipalities, comparisons are hard because of the different 
classification methods used in each country, and, of course, because of different 
assignments of responsibilities, different needs and cost levels, and so on. As shown in 
Table 8, education expenditures, deriving from the assignment of expenditure 
competencies, are an important item in the local budgets of Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and 
Colombia; in all these countries, education expenditures represent between 22 and 37 
percent of the local budgets. For the same reason, expenditures on health services are 
relatively important in the local budgets of Brazil, Colombia, and Peru, with budget 
shares here ranging between 16 and 22 percent. It is noteworthy that in most of these 
countries for which disaggregated data are available, not surprisingly the most important 
expenditure item in terms of budget shares is ―general administration.‖50  
 
Table 8: Shares of Local Government Expenditure by Functional Classification 
 
Country  
(Most recent year) 
General 
administration 
(% of total) 
Education 
(% of total) 
Health 
(% of 
total) 
Sanitation 
(% of total) 
Transport 
(% of total) 
Others 
(% of 
total) 
Argentina(2006) 28.69% 4.31% 9.93% 0.00% 7.35% 49.72% 
Bolivia(2008) 4.77% 22.15% 7.20% 1.41% n.a. 64.47% 
Brazil(2007) 17.86% 25.99% 21.94% 2.97% 3.05% 28.20% 
Chile(2007) 42.84% 36.86% 11.89% 0.00% 0.00% 8.42% 
Colombia(2006) 18.56% 26.51% 19.58% 3.76% 0.00% 31.58% 
Peru(2007) 30.72% 9.79% 16.06% 0.00% 20.08% 23.35% 
Venezuela(2007) 26.27% 3.04% 9.31% n.a. 11.37% 50.00% 
  
II. Special Issues, Constraints and Opportunities for Local and 
Intergovernmental Finance in the Region 
As shown in Section 1, the Latin American region offers a vast array of different 
experiences and approaches to local finance. The kinds of issues facing local 
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 Expenditures in U.S. dollars and the share of the different local sectoral expenditures in GDP are shown 
in Table A.7 in the Appendix. 
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governments in large federal countries such as Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico are often 
very different from those affecting local governments in small countries such as El 
Salvador, Nicaragua, or Paraguay. Furthermore, there is also significant diversity among 
the large federal countries as well as among the unitary countries. Hence, the attempt to 
generalize in the analysis of local problems and their solutions is neither always possible 
nor desirable. The analysis is intended to help policymakers develop a better 
understanding of the issues and explore potential remedies in a particular case—not to 
prescribe general solutions to problems that, even if at one level are similar, are 
happening in different contexts Nevertheless, some themes common to a significant 
number of countries in the region—even if in somewhat different ways and degrees— 
clearly emerge from the description of the local finance system presented in Section 1. In 
this section we identify some of the special issues, constraints and opportunities for the 
development of local finance in Latin America. The section is organized around four 
major themes: (a) Organizational Structure; (b) Intergovernmental Fiscal System Design; 
(c) Budget Process and Transparency; and (d) Short Terms and Long Term Structural 
Challenges.    
 II.a Issues on Organizational Structure 
Fragmentation and sub-optimal scale
51
  
Many countries in the region have numerous local governments that are too small 
to take advantage of economies of scales in the delivery of public services. Often this 
problem is aggravated by the incentives provided for further fragmentation by transfer 
formulas that ensure fixed amounts of funds to each municipality, regardless of size.
52
 In 
response to this problem some countries have introduced legislation requiring minimum 
population size in order to ensure the future fiscal viability of any new local government. 
This action can be effective in slowing down the process of further fragmentation but it 
does not help to address the inadequate scale of the already existing municipalities. Even 
                                                 
51
 The issues of local fragmentation and administrative capacity have a significant political component and 
from that perspective they were reviewed in GOLD I.  Our main perspective here is on how fragmentation 
and administrative capacity may affect the fiscal sustainability of local governments. 
52
 For example, in El Salvador, the Fund for Economic and Social Development (FODES), which is the 
main source of local revenues, is distributed according to a formula that distributes 25 percent of the funds 
evenly to all municipalities. 
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though many countries offer voluntary consolidation or amalgamation programs, these 
measures, as is the experience in other regions of the world afflicted with the same 
problem, tend to be quite ineffective even when accompanied by financial incentives for 
the municipalities involved; in fact voluntary amalgamation of local governments has 
been very rare in the region. One solution is the forced amalgamation by central mandate. 
But even though this approach has been used by some countries outside the Latin 
America region, the approach can be quite disruptive and politically difficult to 
implement, which explains why it has never been used in the region. Perhaps a more 
attractive and potentially equally effective approach is the promotion and creation of 
associations of municipalities into mancomunidades for the delivery of certain public 
services requiring certain minimum scale.
53
 This is an approach still largely unexploited 
but it is currently being developed in some countries, especially in southern Brazil, 
Ecuador or Peru.
54
  
The trade-off between economies of scale and representation
55
   
The issue of an optimal scale of local governments presents an inherent tradeoff 
between the (potential) better political connection in terms of representation and 
accountability of smaller jurisdictions with the (potential) greater fiscal viability of larger 
jurisdictions.  Thus, the issue of jurisdiction size is not only or primarily a technical issue, 
but also one that involves political considerations.
56
  Economies of scale allow greater 
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 However, these programs can be difficult to implement. For example, in El Salvador, the National Plan 
for Territorial Development and Organization (PNODT) was supposed to promote mancomunidades and 
general cooperation among local governments which would allow them to lower administrative costs by 
working together to print jointly needed forms and gathering regularly to share ideas. However, local 
governments remain uncoordinated and have for the most part failed to work together and take advantage 
of economies of scale where applicable. 
54
 Other approaches to dealing with the problem of inadequate scale include the contracting out to private 
companies of some services, so that private companies can benefit from sufficient scale by supplying 
different municipalities, or the creation of ‗sector specific‘ service governments or districts. The 
privatization of services is being used in several Latin American countries quite successfully; the creation 
of special districts or single purpose jurisdictional arrangements, quite common in North America, has been 
adopted at some level in some countries in Central America (El Salvador, Nicaragua) for the administration 
of health and education (SILOS-SILAIS, etc). Special districts do the same thing as mancomunidades, but 
these latter are purely voluntary. See Martinez-Vazquez and Gomez (2008) for a discussion of the issues 
and solutions.   
55
 See Martinez-Vazquez and Gomez (2008) and Imansyah and Martinez-Vazquez (2009) for a more 
extensive discussion of this issue. 
56
 From this perspective, it is interesting to note how some larger local governments organize themselves; 
for example, in the case of Bogotá, the sub-mayoralities receive modest grants for community participatory 
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efficiency in services production thanks to the greater size of service areas covered with 
the union of local governments. Nevertheless, the responsiveness to the needs and 
preferences of residents and accountability of public officials tend to deteriorate with size 
or scale. to the local government.  
The essence of this trade-off between the greater efficiency of smaller 
governments that can better match local preferences and desires of local residents in their 
expenditure allocation and economies of scale in production with lower costs associated 
with larger governments implies a compromise solution between the two objectives. In 
particular, it implies that lower cost effectiveness in the delivery of public services may 
be offset by greater efficiency in responding to the needs and preferences of local 
residents.  
Local administrative capacity 
Closely associated with the problem of small size is the lack of administrative 
capacity of local governments in many countries. Interestingly, one effect of 
decentralization reforms in the region has been the distancing between central 
government agencies and municipalities. Central governments (or state or provincial 
governments in the case of federal countries) spend too little time and resources in 
developing the capacity of local governments.
57
 Some of the slack has been taken up by 
municipal government associations, which, for example in some of the Andean countries 
and in Central America, provide their members with assistance and training. However, 
these associations often lack the resources necessary to address this issue. Central (or 
provincial–state) governments can do much more. Some best practices do exist in the 
region (see Box 1) and could be imitated in other countries.    
Summarizing, there are no exact answers or methodologies to address the issues 
of optimal size for municipalities. Several goals need to be pursued including cost 
                                                                                                                                                 
decision making, while larger metropolitan/network infrastructure decisions are made and implemented by 
the city government. 
57
 The Latin America region shows a lower prevalence of Ministries of Local Government/Interior/Home 
Affairs that are more prevalent in other regions of the world and higher presence of special agencies 
designed to exclusively address the needs of local governments, such as ISEDM y FISDL in El Salvador or  
INIFOM in Nicaragua. In general, it is easier for these types of specialized agencies to play a supporting 
and capacity development role than it is for sectoral ministries; the downside is that the specialized 
agencies tend pull a lower rank within the government administrations in the bargain for additional 
resources. 
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efficiency and representation and accountability and several constraints need to be met 
regarding fiscal viability and administrative capacity. See Box 2. 
 
 
Box 1: Developing Local Administrative Capacity in Chile   
 
Although Chile is not by any means a highly decentralized country in the Latin America region, it has 
had several successful programs dedicated to strengthening the administrative capacity that could serve 
as a best practice for the region. An important ingredient of this success is that municipal governments 
maintain a stable number of employees –with the support of the law- and that they can pay relatively 
competitive wages, comparable with private sector levels, so that municipalities are able to better retain 
professional and technical staff.
58
 Chile‘s municipal institutions have been strengthened through new 
municipal development initiatives such as: the Municipal Development Program (PROFIM), the 
Program of Innovation and Best Local Government Practices, the Program for Regional and Institutional 
Development, the Program for Information Technology and Communications and the National System 
of Municipal Information. Each of these programs has been designed to strengthen a specific aspect of 
municipal administrative capacity and have been in operation for the past fifteen years, often funded by 
foreign governments and multilateral agencies.  
PROFIM was designed to improve the management capacity of local governments in planning, 
productive development, financial management, human resources, and management of social services.  
The program was implemented in two phases. The first, between 1993 and 1999, included only 24 
municipalities, and the second, between 1999 and 2004, was extended to include a further 100 
municipalities.  
The Program of Innovation and Best Local Government Practices encourages municipal officials who 
wish to innovate in both technological and social programs through a competition that invites all 
municipal officials in the country to submit their best initiatives and innovative projects. Those selected 
participate in exchange programs to learn about good practices in other national or foreign 
municipalities.  
The Program for Information Technology and Communications for municipal management and citizen 
control promotes the creation of electronic portals open to the public for information on municipal 
procedures and the delivery of municipal services. 
The National System for Municipal Information (SINIM), allows access via Internet to different 
indicators –by municipality, region or for the whole of the country‘s local governments- on management, 
finance, staff, public services, education, health and other key aspects of the Chilean municipal 
functioning. (see: www.sinim.cl).  
A few years ago, a National System of Municipal Training was established by request from the Chilean 
Association of Municipalities, which operates it jointly with the Sub-Secretariat of Regional and 
Administrative Development of the central government. 
 
 
 
 
Box 2: Four Possible Criteria to Consider for the Minimum Size of Municipalities 
 
Although the desirable minimum size of municipalities is a complex issue that must be addressed in the 
historical and political contexts of each country, there are four basic criteria that can be followed as 
guideline for policy decisions:  
  
(1) The production/cost efficiency/population criterion. The international experience shows that although 
                                                 
58
  See Castañeda (1992) for a discussion of these issues. Adequate salaries and employee turnover are still 
major problems for local governments in many countries in Latin America. For example, in the Dominican 
Republic, 75% of local government employees earn less than 3,000 Dominican pesos ($??), a salary which 
places them in the bottom quintile of the country‘s earnings distribution.  
 
24                                               International Studies Program Working Paper Series 
unit costs for some public services are not much affected by the scale or size of the local government, in 
the case of other services (such as water, brown fields or public transportation) unit costs can be much 
affected by scale. Thus, given the existence of economies of scale for some specific services, depending 
on the assignment of expenditure responsibilities, in order to arrive at the lowest cost of production it is 
required to reach a minimum size in terms of population. Depending on the type of services, the minimum 
population size can range between 10 thousand and 100 thousand. Yet we must note that there are other 
ways to provide services in a cost efficient manner than by imposing a minimum absolute size on all local 
governments, including buying the services from a larger local government, creating an association 
between several smaller local governments and join forces to produce the service, or even buying the 
services from a large privatized producer. What this means is that this criterion of a minimum population 
size should be administered intelligently with flexibility to allow for these other service delivery 
possibilities.  
 
 (2) The representation/political responsiveness/accountability criterion. The general presumption is that 
smaller local governments will generally tend to be more representative and accountable to the residing 
population. But consideration must also be given to ethnic diversity or fractionalization of the population 
and adequate representation of the interest of minority groups. Consideration may also be given to 
population density. From an accountability and representation focus it would seem that a simple but useful 
rule of thumb will be the time required to travel to the location of the municipality building.  
 
(3) The financial/fiscal capacity criterion.  It does seem reasonable to require that any new local 
government have a minimum level of economic capacity to self finance some of its service needs. How to 
measure this capacity is not always an easy matter, but it should involve some approximation to the 
―expenditure needs‖ and the ―fiscal capacity‖ of each potential municipality and the setting of some 
threshold for the difference between needs and capacity. 
 
(4) The administrative capacity criterion.   This can be measured in a number of different ways, but 
fundamentally what is required is that there be qualified personnel available for running efficiently the 
business of the local government. 
  
II.b Issues on Intergovernmental Fiscal System Design    
Lack of clarity in the assignment of expenditure responsibilities to local governments  
One of the weakest points of many decentralization programs in Latin America 
has been the scant attention given to a clear assignment of expenditure responsibilities of 
sub-national governments, thus ignoring this crucial first step in the design of any system 
of intergovernmental fiscal relations. Instead, the focus often has been almost exclusively 
on putting in place some form of financing scheme.
59
 At present, there continues to be 
too much emphasis in many countries of the region on decentralization processes simply 
understood ―as the provision of some of revenue sharing and transfers‖ to local 
governments, ignoring the fundamental rule that ―finance should follow function.‖ To be 
sure, in most countries in the region it is possible to extract from different pieces of 
legislation (including the constitution, municipal codes) an explicit statement or an 
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 See Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2006) for a discussion of the proper sequencing of decentralization 
reforms. 
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approximation of what expenditure assignments may be, but this is generally misleading 
in that in those assignments there is still a high level of imprecision regarding what local 
governments are responsible for vis-à-vis central agencies (or provincial- state agencies) 
and regarding national transfers and grants. On closer analysis, the assignment of 
functional responsibilities remains in many cases too general and vague. For example in 
El Salvador, the municipal code gives authority to municipalities to perform a list of 
duties or responsibilities that clearly overlaps with those also assigned to central 
government; the same is true in Uruguay. In other cases, the vagueness and confusion lie 
in the way that legislation is implemented (or not implemented). For example, Law 66 of 
1997 in the Dominican Republic added primary and secondary education to the 
responsibilities of local governments; yet real power and decision-making remain with 
the regional Education and Culture committees, which may be considered a 
deconcentrated tier of the central government.
60
  
Beyond the operational inefficiencies associated with the unclear assignments of 
functions, an important consequence of unclear responsibilities are the ambiguities in 
political accountability this situation introduces—how do people know which level of 
government to hold accountable for what?  The governance implications and what this 
means for attaining the purported benefits of decentralization are quite considerable. 
Another problem is that the assignment of expenditure responsibilities in 
practically all Latin American countries is uniform for all local governments, regardless 
of their size and administrative capacity. As we saw above, a good way to address these 
shortcomings is the creation of associations of local governments into mancomunidades. 
Alternatively, there may be room for asymmetric assignments for municipalities of 
different size and administrative capacity  
 
Nevertheless, highly asymmetric assignment of expenditure responsibilities can 
itself lead to confusion. For example, in Ecuador, the Constitution (Article 226) 
establishes the obligation of central government to transfer functional competencies at the 
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 Although the trend in the region has been toward more devolution of responsibilities to local 
governments, there are exceptions. For example, Jamaica has been recentralizing functions previously 
assigned to the local governments (Parish Councils) through the creation of national entities under the 
tutelage of the Ministry of Local Government, which is in charge of fire protection services, parks and 
markets. 
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discretion (by voluntary request) of sub-national governments. This means that any sub-
national government can request a full or partial competence in a particular area at their 
discretion, leading to great heterogeneity in central-local relations, thereby compromising 
the overall effectiveness of intergovernmental coordination. A better practice could be to 
design two or at most three different packages of expenditure responsibilities that can be 
devolved to local governments depending on their administrative capacity. However, an 
important issue with asymmetric approaches is the need for using verifiable criteria— 
that is, differential assignments must be grounded in something other than political 
connections.  
Another factor contributing to confusion in the assignment of expenditure 
responsibilities is the common practice of unfunded mandates. Frequently, line ministries 
may partially decentralize certain competencies to local governments without providing 
the required resources to implement them properly. There may also be increasing 
reporting requirements on local governments without adequate coordination among 
central government agencies or the provision of the technical and financial means to 
make that reporting possible.  
A workable system of expenditure assignments, no matter how specific, is 
developed in the laws and regulations, always requires institutions of coordination and 
effective dialog between the different levels of governments. Because of the larger 
number of municipalities, it is important that the voice and interests of these local 
governments be represented by associations of municipalities. On this front there has 
been considerable progress since practically all countries in the regions have developed 
effective municipal associations that have taken on the representation of municipal 
interests.
61
 However, central authorities have not always recognized and accepted these 
associations as strategic partners in improving policy design in expenditure assignments 
and in strengthening all other components of fiscal decentralization systems. 
One final issue in the practice of expenditure assignments is the practically 
universal lack of effective and transparent methodologies to translate the assignment of 
functional responsibilities into expenditure needs. Sometimes, historical costs (or levels 
of expenditures prior to decentralization) are used as a guide.  Different methodologies 
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 See, for example, the discussion in Porto (2009).  
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are used in other countries around the world that could be successfully implemented in 
the region. The advantage of having some effective method to calculate expenditure 
needs is that the discussions on, and ultimate design of, revenue assignments, whether 
through own revenue or fiscal transfers, becomes more informed and rational.   
 
Insufficient revenue autonomy 
The level of tax revenue autonomy of local governments differs quite 
significantly across Latin American countries. Countries such as Brazil and Chile have 
relatively high autonomy and countries such as El Salvador, Mexico and Peru have 
significantly less autonomy. But, in general, as in some other regions of the world 
(Africa, Asia and many European countries), local revenue autonomy in Latin America 
remains below what is desirable. There is a debate in the fiscal decentralization literature 
as to what the ―desirable‖ level of local revenue autonomy would be. According to one 
view, all that is needed is that local governments have revenue autonomy ―at the margin.‖ 
This means that they should have to either raise or lower their own taxes in order to 
expand or contract their budgets, even when the rest of the financing is done through 
government transfers and revenue sharing. From this point of view, autonomy at the 
margin should thus allow local authorities to adjust their resources while showing 
flexibility, accountability and transparency towards residents. According to a second 
view, more accountability and especially more fiscally responsible behavior of local 
governments within the national public finance system require near to full self-financing 
by those local governments that have the fiscal means –i.e., the necessary own tax base 
— to do so, while other local governments with lower tax bases also ought to be helped 
through equalization grants. This second view also allows for the existence of conditional 
central government grants to support the implementation of national development 
programs and priorities at the local level. Although newer and less well-known, the 
second view offers all the advantages of the first view plus it can add significantly on the 
fiscal responsibility and government accountability sides. However, it could be argued 
that fuller financing of municipalities with their own taxes may not be possible because 
of tax administration issues; for example, collecting some taxes at the central level could 
allow economies of scale and information advantages that would not be present if those 
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taxes were collected locally. But here it is very important to differentiate between the 
assignments of certain taxes to local governments (in the sense of which level gets the 
revenues and decides on the applicable tax rates) and who actually does the 
administration of those taxes. In particular, it is quite possible to assign a certain tax at 
the local level and have it administered by the central tax administration authorities.
62
 For 
example, in Chile, the real estate tax is entirely designed for municipal use but it is 
collected by a specialized agency of the central government (Servicio de Impuestos 
Internos, SII), which manages to keep the levels of  tax evasion low.    
The lion‘s share of financing for local governments in the region continues to 
come from different forms of central government transfers including revenue sharing. 
This is a common feature in other regions of the world; transfers have experienced an 
increasing trend as they are the most often used form of financing newly devolved 
responsibilities to local governments. With this in mind, some important and correct 
policies have been adopted in various countries of the region.  For example, many 
countries in the Latin American region have taken steps to increase the share of own 
taxes in local budgets. Most countries have now assigned the property tax to the local 
level. This is a good thing because there are many features of the property tax that make 
it an ideal tax for local governments.
63
 However, the property tax remains highly 
underutilized in the region for a variety of reasons.
64
 As we have seen, several other taxes 
have also been assigned to local governments in many countries, including vehicle tax, 
betterment levies, and different forms of business taxes and licenses. These are good 
measures to be imitated by those countries that still allow too little local tax autonomy. 
Another best practice measure to be imitated by all countries in the region is to allow a 
                                                 
62
 See, for example, Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev ( 2005). We must note that there is no guarantee that 
the central tax administration will be more efficient and productive in the collection of local taxes; among 
several concerns, the central administration may have low incentives to collect local taxes. Recently in 
Costa Rica collections from the property tax increased very significantly after the administration and 
enforcement of this tax was shifted from the central tax administration to the municipalities.  
63
 The property tax is highly visible and because of the low geographical mobility of its base and because 
property values tend to reflect well in general the quality of local services, the property tax can approximate 
well the concept of a benefit tax, where residents pay for the services they receive (see Sepulveda and 
Martinez-Vazquez, 2009). All of this is likely to increase political accountability of local officials. The 
property tax may also have relatively low efficiency losses compared to other local taxes. In terms of 
administration, there can be flexibility in taking advantage of a mixed local and central administration and 
enforcement approaches See Bahl, Martinez-Vazquez and Youngman (2008 and 2010).     
64
 See Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez (2009) for an evaluation of the performance of property taxes in 
the region. 
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certain degree of discretion to municipalities in setting the rates of their local taxes, 
between some maximum and minimum approved levels.  
Nevertheless, it is difficult to make a strong case for the policy design of a greater 
degree of tax autonomy for local governments when there is at least a perception that 
many local governments in the region do not make effective use of the tax autonomy that 
is currently granted to them in the law. This is most clear in the case of the property tax 
for which actual revenues collected are a small fraction of the revenue potential.
65
 So the 
realization of more revenue autonomy for local governments may need to be 
accompanied by a significant improvement in local tax effort. However, it is important to 
note that low tax effort (known in the region as ‗pereza fiscal‘) is a complex problem. 
First, there is often confusion between low tax effort (‗pereza fiscal‘) and low tax 
capacity or economic/fiscal poverty of jurisdictions. Establishing the presence of ‗pereza 
fiscal‘ requires a comparison between actual tax collections and potential tax collections 
of every particular jurisdictions; this is a difficult and complex task in many cases. 
Second, once the presence of ‗pereza fiscal‘ can be established, it is important to 
understand its multiple roots, from simple political economy issues (local officials may 
simply be happy spending funds but never raising them), to lack of economic resources 
(building an updated fiscal cadastre is expensive), to inadequate methodologies for 
evaluation, to the lack of skilled human resources, or even to the negative incentives to 
local tax effort provided by the central government‘s existing fiscal transfer system. 
However, the region offers success stories in raising local tax effort, as provided by the 
recent experiences of Bogotá and Lima (see Box 3).  
 
 
Box 3:  A Tale of Two Cities: Bogotá’s Success Story in Raising Local Tax Effort 
and Lima’s Success with a New Approach to Tax Administration 
 
Bogotá provides an example of a local government that has had success in raising local tax effort (the 
city was awarded a prize by the United Nations in 2002 for being the most improved local government in 
the world.) Starting in the late 1980s, The Municipality of Bogotá began a program of civic education 
during which it emphasized the importance of paying taxes and the accompanying benefits for citizens 
that derive from a stronger local government. It significantly increased property tax collections through a 
series of administrative improvements, enforced business taxes, privatized certain government run 
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 See Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez (2009)  
30                                               International Studies Program Working Paper Series 
organizations, and successfully issued its own bonds, including foreign markets, receiving a AAA rating, 
66
 Particularly noteworthy is that the Municipality of Bogotá in 2006 raised 42 percent of its tax revenues 
from the local business tax (Impuesto de Industria y Comercio, ICA). The updating of the fiscal cadastre 
in 2009 has also produced significant increases in revenues from the property tax. It is expected that the 
assessed tax base for this levy will increase by more than 50 percent by 2010, bringing additional $51 
millions in revenues or a 13.3 percent increase over collections before the updating of the cadastre.   
 
Lima introduced in 1996 with some other provincial Peruvian municipalities a semi-autonomous Tax 
Administration Service (SAT in Spanish), with the goal of increasing collections for own local taxes. 
This followed the model of a national-level SAT. The SAT of Lima is autonomous in its financial and 
human resource management and it is financed through a share of the taxes and fees commissions it 
collects. The sharing in collections by Peruvian municipalities range from 3% to 10%. But note that the 
local authorities are still responsible for regulating and controlling the SATs‘ work. There have been 
some clear benefits for those Peruvian municipalities that, like Lima, adopted a SAT approach. For 
example, those municipalities that adopted a SAT increased their own revenue by 80.9 %, or 9 % annual 
average, between 1998 to 2007; by comparison over the same period the municipalities that did not 
adopt a SAT saw their revenues increase by 61.2%,  or 6.8% annual average. The empirical studies show 
that the trust in tax administration in Lima and other municipalities where a SAT was adopted has 
increased. This could be attributed to lower political intervention in administrative processes, higher 
client focus management, improved public relations, and a reduction of corrupt practices. But not all 
have been kudos for the new local tax administration. The same empirical survey studies identify some 
issues associated with the SATs: a limited link between the revenue collection and public services and 
the public perception of tax administration as ―insensible.‖ But some of this is to be expected since the 
SATs have gone against the conventions and took advantage of not well defined rules, especially in the 
SAT of Lima. One of the key characteristics of the SAT agencies has been their innovation drive, 
including internal processes, the use of modern technologies, human resource development, improved 
financial management, and the collaboration across tax administrations.  
 
 
 
A third issue is the need to explore what other taxes with significant revenue 
potential could possibly be assigned to local governments in order to increase their 
revenue self-sufficiency, such as, for example, a flat-rate piggy back personal income tax 
or local surtaxes on some excise duties, such as those on vehicle fuel. Another possibility 
may be the wider adoption of other taxes that have been working quite well in some 
countries in the Latin American region. An example of that is the more intense use of 
betterment levies of taxes, which can complement annual real property taxes. Betterment 
levies are being used quite successfully, for example, in Colombia. See Box 4. Another 
possibility is the adoption of some form of final retail tax such as in the case of Brazil‘s 
ISS (Tax on Services, as discussed in Box 5.) But although this type of tax fits fine within 
the Brazilian tax system where the federal and state VAT levies exclude for their bases 
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many important services, it may be more problematic in most other country contexts for 
overlapping with the existing VATs.
67
  
An alternative to the ISS, that would not present potential conflicts with the 
existing national VATs, is the broader base local business tax (Impuesto de Industria y 
Comercio, ICA) in Colombia. This is a local ―direct‖ tax on all business activities 
(industry, trade and services) that uses as the presumptive base the monetary value of 
annual transactions and it is levied at different rates depending on the sector ranging from 
0.41 percent for the production of food stuffs to 1.38 percent for the sales of alcoholic 
beverages, tobacco products and fuels; financial transactions pay a rate of 1.1 percent.   
The ICA is one of the most important sources of municipal tax revenues in Colombia, on 
average representing approximately 42 percent of annual tax revenues of municipalities, 
but as much as 72 percent in the Municipality of Cali.  
Another form of local business tax with revenue potential is Chile‘s ―patente 
municipal.‖ This annual levy, which is administered by the municipalities, is paid on any 
commercial activity (trade, professional, industrial, and sale of alcoholic beverages) that 
requires a permanent office location; municipalities select rates between 0.25 and 0.5 
percent  that fall on the declared (to the national tax administration) own capital of the 
business. The ―patente municipal‖ raises approximately the same amount of municipal 
revenues in Chile as the property tax (―impuesto territorial.‖) 
In order of importance, in terms of revenue collections in the Latin American 
region, the two sets of taxes that are generally of equal importance include, first, the 
property taxes (impuesto sobre los bienes inmuebles, IBI) and the different taxes on 
business activities and services. In a distant third place we find those taxes falling on the 
use of motor vehicles. Generally, there would appear to be fiscal space to increase local 
revenues for taxes on motor vehicles. This is also the case in many countries in the 
regions for local fees and charges where in many cases these can be completely out of 
date.
68
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 For example, in the recent past Nicaragua eliminated  a quite productive local sales tax as part of policy 
conditionality from the International Monetary Fund precisely because of the conflict it represented with 
the existing national VAT.   
68
 For example, reportedly in the case of El Salvador municpal fees and charges date from 1954.  
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Box 4: Betterment Levies (“Contribución de Valorización”) in Colombia 
 
In general terms, a betterment tax recoups some of the benefits accrued to property owners due to adjacent 
public investment that increases the value of that property. (Bird & Slack 2006). Since most real state 
property is significantly affected by public facilities surrounding it, this tax has significant revenue 
potential.  In Colombia, this tax receives the name Contribución de Valorización, with a long history 
dating back to colonial times. The constitution gives municipalities and other public entities the right to a 
share on the added value produced by investments made in urban settings (e.g. infrastructure works). The 
tax is being looked at with interest in other countries and the first Latin American conference of 
Valorization was held in Bogota (Colombia) in 2009.
69
 The levying of the tax implies a series of steps 
including, the determination of the costs and benefits of the project, the geographical area that is expected 
to benefit and a method to distribute the costs and benefits of the project among the different properties. 
This distribution can use an array of ‗benefit factors‘(use of property, closeness, access, etc.) or simply a 
land area, linear size of lot front, etc.  
 
Bogotá also levies a tax called Participación en Plusvalia
70
 defined as the contribution owed by owners of 
real estate property as a result of modifications that increase the value of property. This is similar to the 
betterment tax except that it captures only changes in urban codes that affect the ways the property can be 
used or the intensity of its use (how much can be constructed) that may increase its value. 
 
 
 
Box 5: The ISS in Brazil71 
 
 The ISS (Imposto sobre Servicos/Tax on Services) is a municipal level tax levied on those services that 
are left out of Brazil‘s state value added tax (ICMS). The services that may be taxed under ISS are defined 
by federal law, but the states may decide whether to tax or exempt some of those services. The base 
covers a wide range of services including, IT services, rental of premises, medical services, veterinary 
services, personal services (barber shops, etc), professional services (engineering, architecture, law, 
accounting, etc.),  education and training, hotels and tourism, parking, leisure entertainment (movies, 
shows), repair services, financial services (by banks, etc.), municipal transportation, port, terminal, and 
airport services. The tax base is the revenue generated from the provision of services. The rate that 
municipalities may charge for ISS is locally set but cannot exceed 5 percent (in the past, it could go as 
high as 10 percent). Although the tax rate to be applied is the one charged by the municipality in which 
the business resides, there are exceptions in which the tax rate is the one belonging to the municipality 
where the service is rendered (e.g. construction). Producers of services are charged with paying and 
recordkeeping of the ISS. Buyers of services do not directly see the tax they pay as it is included in the 
price charged to them by vendors.  
 
Although the ISS is collected at the municipal level, its importance varies greatly across local 
governments; according to the Receita Federal (national tax administration) 1 percent of municipalities 
(out of more than 5,500) account for 73 percent of the tax collection. The ISS collected approximately 
0.5% of GDP in the mid-to-late 1990s and more recently, tax collections are near 0.8% of GDP. As the 
maximum tax rates were lowered sometime in the early 2000s, the observed increase in collections as 
share of GDP might come either from an expanded tax base and/or better efforts in collecting the tax. 
There is some evidence of the expansion of the tax base; when the rates were lowered in 2003, the ISS 
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 I Congreso Latinoamericano de Valorizacion;  http://www.lonjadebogota.org.co/Portals/0/Docs/ 
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 Information about this tax may be found at: 
http://www.shd.gov.co/portal/page/portal/portal_internet/impuestos/impuestos_imp/Plusvalia/INFO%20PL
USVALIA  
71
 See, among others, Deloitte (2010), Government of Brazil (2009), KPMG (2006), Banco Central do 
Brasil (2000) and Purohit (1997). 
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was also extended to services provided by financial institutions –in particular banking services. 
 
The ISS is not without problems. One issue is the multiplying of the tax in the production of 
products/services for future use, since users of services cannot identify the amounts of ISS paid to balance 
against the ISS they would receive; remembering that the price for the services are ISS inclusive. Another 
issue has been the treatment given to exports. The import of services is subject to this tax, and although it 
should not apply to exported services, in fact in serveral circumstances some exports may become subject 
to this tax.
72
 .  
 
With regard to the future of the ISS, there have recently been calls in Brazil for the simplification of the 
tax system where–one way or another- the elimination of the ISS was contemplated. This viewpoint 
supports the integration of the federal-based IPI and state-based ICMS (both value-added type taxes) and 
the locally-based ISS within a general VAT whose revenues could be shared by all three levels of 
government. However, the increasing importance of the ISS in municipal budgets, the potential loss in 
local autonomy, and the difficulties of coordination at different levels of government weigh-in on the 
other side of the argument.  
 
 
 
 
Unbundling revenue sharing  
Revenue sharing is the most common mechanism for arranging fiscal transfers to 
sub-national governments in Latin America and in many countries provisions for revenue 
sharing are enshrined in the constitution. As mentioned in Section 1, fiscal 
decentralization to local has often been understood simply as the sharing of central 
government revenues without relating the additional revenue to any particular 
expenditure assignments to local and regional governments.  
One of the most negative aspects of revenue sharing in other parts of the world is 
that it can exacerbate the substantial horizontal disparities across local governments when 
carried out on a derivation (i.e. origin basis). Fortunately, this has generally been avoided 
in Latin American countries.
73
 An important exception has been the revenue sharing in 
natural resources, which in countries such as Peru and Ecuador is fundamentally 
implemented on a derivation basis. This has led to significant horizontal disparities 
among municipalities.
74
 In most Latin American countries fiscal transfers from revenue 
                                                 
72
 See KPMG (2006). 
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 Note that this does not mean that there are no significant regional disparities in the Latin American 
region, it simply means that the more frequent use of the derivation or origin principle would have made 
things worse. As discussed above, regional fiscal disparities arise from the differences in economic bases. 
And the more tax autonomy is provided the higher the potential for enlarged fiscal disparities and therefore 
the higher need for the implementation of equalization grants.   
74
 In the case of Peru, the evolution of international prices for natural resources has had a significant impact 
on the transfers system. The Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) currently shares 50 percent of 
mining and hydrocarbon revenues with local governments. Transfers from central government to regional 
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sharing are distributed according to a set of parameters or formulas that tries to achieve 
several objectives, one of which is some degree of equalization. One of the positive 
aspects of revenue sharing is that it manages to combine the unconditional use of funds 
with rather plentiful and buoyant sources of revenue.   
The main problem with general revenue sharing is that there is some confusion 
over what exactly distribution formulas are trying to achieve; pursuing many objectives 
with essentially one instrument tends to be the source of that confusion. Also, it is not 
always clear that the best way to proceed is to give local governments the unconditional 
use of all of these funds.
75
 The reforms being introduced or contemplated in some Latin 
American countries consist fundamentally of the unbundling of the revenue sharing 
system into two additional separate transfer mechanisms, namely: (i) an equalization 
transfer with unconditional use of funds and financed from a pool extracted from the 
shared revenues. This would exclusively pursue the goal of equalization of horizontal 
fiscal disparities, and (ii) a system of specific or conditional grants for current 
expenditure and investment purposes, financed with also some of the revenue sharing 
funds. The use of these funds would be earmarked in pursuit of a variety of  sectoral 
objectives. Advances in this general direction have been made in countries like Brazil and 
Chile, while countries like Ecuador, El Salvador and Honduras are still using an 
unbundled revenue sharing scheme as the main funding source of local governments,   
 
The need to rationalize the transfer system  
The system of transfers plays a pivotal role in drawing together the other elements 
of the intergovernmental fiscal system—making up for the vertical and horizontal gaps 
                                                                                                                                                 
and local governments increased exponentially after 2000 but plummeted in 2009. This experience has 
given rise to very significant horizontal imbalances between municipalities because the sharing of mining 
revenues is highly concentrated on seven departments, accounting for close to 80% of the total. This has 
created problems with increased unspent balances during the boom years because of limited capacity to 
identify and execute productive investment projects. It has also continued to expose local governments to 
high volatility in revenue streams, as witnessed with the oil price boom of two years ago and the more 
recent global recession. This raises the larger issue of the need for diversification of the subnational 
revenue pool. 
75
 The point here is to achieve in the shorter term a more appropriate mix of unconditional and conditional 
grants, but without losing sight of the fact that, in the longer term, it is desirable to increase 
unconditionality of local governments funding – although obviously not for everything--, as new functions 
are undertaken, local performance improves, and so on.  
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that own source revenues and revenue sharing cannot meet, not undermining local tax 
effort, creating incentives for externality generating spending that local governments 
would not fund out of their own sources, not undermining incentives for creditworthy 
municipalities to borrow, and so on. This all requires a carefully executed structure of 
transfers, using different instruments to pursue different objectives and making sure these 
instruments do not work against each other.  
With the exception of a few countries, the current system of transfers to local 
governments in Latin America lacks a clear orientation. Most countries still have to 
introduce unconditional equalization grants that incorporate in some formula-based 
measures of expenditure needs and fiscal capacity.
76
 When some equalization elements 
are introduced into the revenue sharing formulas, actual revenue collections are often 
used instead of measures of tax capacity, thereby creating problems of negative 
incentives for tax effort. The current approaches used to incorporate differences in 
expenditure needs in the revenue sharing formulas are also problematic. For example, the 
use of population, which is very common, is a good approximation of need for some 
services but not so good for others. The number of children of school age provides a 
better approximation for basic education needs than population as a whole. The relative 
share of infants and the elderly in the population provides a better approximation for 
health care needs than the population per se. In some cases, especially in Central 
American countries like El Salvador and Nicaragua, the existing formulas positively 
discriminate in favor of small municipalities, which in turn create problems of fairness 
and economic viability and regional development. 
Even though many countries have some form of conditional grants, these lack 
structure and predictability, especially in the area of capital grants. When conditional 
grants are used, complexity of the system is often a problem.
77
 This complicates 
compliance-administrative costs by local governments, in many cases penalizing smaller 
jurisdictions with low administrative capacity, and also dilutes the achievement of central 
government goals. A remedy to these problems, following best international practice, has 
been to consolidate many of these specific or conditional programs into block grants. 
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While the specific conditional grants impose on local governments a narrow use of funds 
(e.g. funds to buy furniture for primary schools), block grants are still conditional but 
have much broader parameters for the use of funds (e.g., the funds must be spent on 
primary education). The advantages of using just a few block grants are simplification 
and expansion of choices for local governments, thus aligning the final allocation of 
public resources more closely to the priorities of individual local governments (e.g., 
repairing the school building instead of buying new furniture), without unduly 
compromising the general goals of central government sectoral policies (e.g., promoting 
the quality and standards of primary education in the country.) 
 
Increasing fiscally responsible local borrowing  
Historically the Latin American region has suffered some of the worst incidences 
of fiscally irresponsible sub-national borrowing in the world. The negative experiences of 
Brazil and Argentina, with uncontrolled sub-national borrowing and hyperinflation 
during the 1980s and 1990s, are still used as examples of what can go wrong in this area 
of sub-national finance. One consequence of those experiences is that the policy of some 
countries in the region towards local government borrowing has become excessively 
conservative and restrictive.  
For example, in Chile, local governments are—in principle—not allowed to 
borrow or take out loans of any kind. But outright prohibitions are not necessary or 
effective either. In the same country, indirect borrowing through leasing contracts or by 
delaying the payment of current expenditure makes that norm difficult to enforce. In 
Uruguay, any domestic or foreign debt issue by local government needs to be approved 
by the national congress. Peru also provides an example of legislative conservatism in the 
matter of local borrowing: The central government has established indebtedness rules to 
maintain fiscal prudence by two laws (the Law on Fiscal Prudence and Transparency -
LPTF- and the Law on Fiscal Responsibility and Transparency – LRTF-) Besides limits 
on debt service ratios and total debt the laws also limit the rate of growth of municipal 
expenditures to a maximum of 3 percent per year. However, this framework has not been 
fully enforced because of insufficient monitoring and the lack of effective sanctions and 
many local governments in Peru carry large budgetary arrears. At the other extreme, and 
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more like an exception, is the case of Paraguay, where there is practically no limit or 
restriction on local borrowing.  
Thus a pending challenge for several countries in the region is how to set up 
institutions that effectively regulate and monitor borrowing without becoming overly 
restrictive of local governments. Many countries are still struggling to introduce a 
credible system of penalties for lack of compliance. The development of information and 
monitoring systems covering all aspects of borrowing,
78
 including budgetary arrears with 
official institutions and private providers, is urgently needed. But the key ingredient for 
fiscally responsible behavior of sub-national units remains the political will of the central 
government authorities to implement the existing regulatory frameworks.  
A second challenge for practically all countries is how to make more credit 
available to local governments for responsible borrowing.
79
 In practice, the level of 
borrowing by local governments in Latin America is far too low to meet the present large 
needs for public infrastructure across the sub-continent.
80
 The exceptions are large cities, 
which tend to have ample access to domestic credit markets and in many cases also to 
international markets with accompanying international credit ratings. Thus, the capital 
cities of La Paz (Bolivia) and Lima (Peru) display a very different picture from that of 
most other municipalities.  
The absence of real access to borrowing by the average municipality in the region 
is a complex issue. It is explained by a multitude of causes, ranging from the lack of tax 
autonomy of local governments to the lack of development of national financial markets. 
One potential remedy for the scarcity of local credit is the creation of semi-official 
financial intermediaries or municipal banks.
81
 As shown in Table 6, several Latin 
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 Monitoring systems for local indebtedness have often proved of doubtful utility. For example, in Ecuador 
and Peru information on debt is taken directly from the financial statements of sub-national governments 
and is not crosscheck with other sources. In Argentina, the Federal Council for Fiscal Responsibility 
created by the Fiscal Responsibility Law of 2004 and in charge of monitoring compliance with norms and 
rules of fiscal and financial behavior does not receive timely information from the majority municipalities 
as of 2009.   
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 Part of the solution can be direct on-lending to municipalities by regional-multinational institutions such 
as the Confederation Andina de Fomento (CAF) or the Banco Centroamericano de Inversiones, or 
international organizations such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) or the World Bank. 
However, a large part of the solution needs to be the mobilization of domestic credit sources. 
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 Brazil is an exception. 
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 Central governments also guarantee on-lending to local governments from multilateral international 
organizations, including the World Bank, the IDB, and CAF.  
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American countries have created this type of institution to facilitate long-term credit to 
local governments. However, the experience of these institutions has been mixed because 
of the difficulty of maintaining them at arms‘ length from central government officials 
and of operating them with strict banking criteria. See Box 6. 
 
 
Box 6: Practice with Municipal Development Banks and Funds in Latin America82 
 
Experience with municipal development banks in Latin America has been mixed, as has been the case in 
many other countries around the world. Although quite a few countries have introduced some sort of 
specialized financial intermediaries or municipal development funds to raise capital financing for local 
governments, fewer of those institutions have been transformed into financial institutions with market-
oriented practices and controls channelling private savings to finance public infrastructure. This box 
presents a summary of experiences with municipal development banks and funds in the Latin America 
region.  
 
Bolivia 
The National Urban Development Service (Servicio Nacional de Desarollo Urbano (SENDU)) existed 
from 1972 to 1986. It was a semi-autonomous agency of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs, 
which provided loans (as well as training courses and technical assistance) to municipalities. This body 
was severely criticized for its liberal loan policy, abolished in 1986 under the structural adjustment 
program imposed by the IMF, and not replaced. 
 
Brazil 
The Integrated Program of State Improvements (PIMES) was established as a municipal development 
fund administered by BADESUL, the development bank of the Rio Grande do Sul, which owns and 
controls it. The program has two components: 1) institutional and human resource development, and 2) 
infrastructure investments. The first component comprises about 10 percent of the total project costs and 
includes technical assistance, training and equipment for municipalities, the State Water Company 
(CORSAN), other state sector agencies, etc. The second component represents about 90 percent of the 
total programs budget and includes the financing of projects in water supply and sanitation, street paving 
and lighting, drainage and erosion control, and so on. The Municipal Action Program (PRAM) was 
established in 1991 by the Parana state bank BANESTADO, originally serving as the bank‘s financial 
agent. PRAM was eventually converted into a revolving State Urban Development Fund (FDU), 
administered by BANESTADO with technical assistance provided by a legally autonomous organization 
that in practice functions as a department of the State of Parana Secretariat of Planning.  
 
PARANACIDADE was created in 1996 as a non-profit corporate entity to provide institutional and 
technical services to municipalities in Parana; this institution also collects and invests financial resources 
from the state‘s urban and regional development program, managing the State Urban Development Fund 
(FDU), which makes loans to municipalities at maturity ranging from 8 years for urban infrastructure to 
10 years for social infrastructure. One of the main explanations for PARANACIDADE‘s success is its 
support of capacity building for municipalities. 
 
                                                 
82
 See Peterson (1996). There are other relevant initiatives in the region that for space reasons are not 
developed in this box, including the Banco del Estado (BEDE)  in Ecuador and La Caixa in Brazil. At the 
regional level the Confederacion Andina de Fomento (CAF) and the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) have been active supporters of on-lending programs for the development of local public 
infrastructure. 
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Colombia 
Colombia has been successful in using its Municipal Development Funds to accelerate the development of 
private credit markets for local government. The Territorial Financing Institution (FINDETER), which 
began in 1994 as an infrastructure financing window within the National Mortgage Bank, eventually 
evolved into a development bank for municipalities, working through the commercial banking system. In 
essence, FINDETER operates as a second-level financing institution which re-discounts commercial bank 
loans to municipalities. The banks‘ good credit experience through FINDETER has led them to commit 
their own resources to municipal lending. Intermediate-sized cities and departments in Colombia now 
borrow primarily through commercial bank loans, while small cities and towns continue to rely on 
FINDETER. The largest cities now finance their credit requirements primarily through bonds.  
 
Honduras 
The Municipal Bank (BANMA) was established in 1961 as a bank owned by municipalities with the 
intent of providing municipalities with financial resources for investment projects and strengthening their 
administrative capacity. However, in 2002 the National Congress approved a decree liquidating BANMA 
due to the failure of its officials to raise enough capital to meet national standards of operation.  
 
Mexico 
The federal public works bank, BANOBRAS, was founded in 1933 as the Banco Nacional Hipotecario 
Urbano y de Obras Públicas, S.A (National Urban Mortgage and Public Works Bank), and has long had a 
loan program for municipal development. Its operations, however, became complex and bureaucratic and 
the allocation of financial resources soon responded more to political than financial criteria. The bank‘s 
heavily subsidized loan program used to focus on social housing, water supply systems and the 
construction of markets and abattoirs. Since 1988, its interest rates have come close to market rates and 
BANOBRAS has switched its focus to improvements of municipal land registers.  
 
 
 
II.c Issues on the Budget Process and Transparency  
Streamlining the budget process at the local level 
Budgets and the budget process at the local level in Latin America have improved 
significantly in recent times. A significant innovation has been the introduction of 
participatory budgeting (See Box 7). Nevertheless, a variety of issues at different stages 
of the budget process still need to be addressed in several countries in the region. In terms 
of budget planning and formulation, as we have seen, there are still countries where local 
governments must have their budgets, or certain aspects of them, approved on an annual 
basis by higher levels of government. 
83
 Ex-ante monitoring and approval of local 
budgets by higher level authorities is not needed, where you have local elected councils 
and an effective ex-post audit system and the use of the courts to address irregularities. 
Local budget autonomy is often also limited in the case of investment projects.
84
 This 
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 These countries include: Bolivia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay,. 
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 For example, in Peru all public investment projects must be approved by the National Public Investment 
System (SNIP) which is managed by the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF). Through the General 
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type of approval is not desirable either even though coordination and exchange 
information can be very useful.
85
 This does not mean that smaller rural municipalities 
may not benefit from technical assistance in putting together improved budget 
documents. Another issue in the preparation stage is the lack of linkages between 
planning and budgeting. It is frequent to see many development plans at the local, 
regional, and national levels that lack coordination and that do not relate to actual budgets 
in terms of the cost of activities for the fulfilment of strategic objectives. 
In terms of budget execution, the misappropriation or lack of the proper 
appropriation of funds by central government is still a problem in several countries. For 
example, in Haiti, 90 percent of local government income supposedly comes from 
transfers from the Funds for the Operation and Development for the Territorial 
Collectives (FGDCT), administered by the Department of the Interior. This central 
government agency claims to distribute those revenues as follows:  50 percent to local 
governments,
86
 40 percent for capital investments and 10 percent remaining within the 
Department of the Interior to cover administrative costs. However, recent studies show 
that these funds are not being distributed as the Department of the Interior claims, and 
that a significant share is retained by the Department to finance its own projects. The 
budgets of communes (i.e. the local governments in Haiti) are the most directly hurt, 
receiving 33 percent less than what they are budgeted to receive.  In nominal terms, local 
governments are receiving only $2.50 per person annually, which dramatizes the 
significance of the lower revenues that they actually receive. Honduras provides another 
example, where the law is not complied with by the central authorities. In particular, 
while the Municipal Code establishes that the central government should allocate 5 
percent of its tax revenue to the municipalities, in fact only 3 percent appears to have 
been allocated in the most recent years.
87
 Other countries, as the Dominican Republic, are 
experimenting similar situations. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Directorate of Multi-Sector Programming (DGPM), MEF has the power to cancel any approval made by 
regional and local governments if DGPM consider that SNIP criteria have not been properly applied. 
85
 The agreements of the local councils can be challenged as in the case of other laws in the constitutional 
courts. 
86
 Of this 50 percent that is designated for local governments, half is supposed to go to the communes, 30 
percent to communal section councils, 7 percent to departmental councils and the remaining to other local 
government assemblies and councils. 
87
  See Cardona (2006). http://www.diba.es/innovacio/fitxers/centroamerica.pdf 
                      Municipal Finances in Latin America: Features, Issues, and Prospects                             41        
 
41 
 
There are still deficiencies in some countries in relation to ex-post audit of local 
budgets.
88
 For example, in Paraguay, many municipalities do not comply with the 
requirement to send their annual financial reports to the Comptroller General of the 
Republic.  
 
Box 7: Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre (Brazil)89 
 
Participatory budgeting has been functioning successfully in the municipality of Porto Alegre, in the state 
of Rio Grande do Sul (Brazil) for the last two decades. The participatory budget of Porto Alegre, called 
OPPA, is a process through which ordinary citizens and a team of elected local government officials work 
together to define a list of projects to be included within the local government budget. Through this 
mechanism for the shared management of budgetary resources, local residents perform the role of 
identifying and controlling the implementation of projects. Thus, through the OPPA, local residents are 
closely associated with the formulation of public policy at the initial stages, including diagnosis and needs 
assessment, the intermediate phase of monitoring and implementation, and the final phase of control and 
accountability. 
 
Since its inception the OPPA has contributed to the improvements in the lives of local resident. The 
number of participants in Porto Alegre has increased year by year, from approximately 1,000 in 1990 to 
nearly 15,000 in 2004. The process has also brought opportunities to better integrate traditionally 
marginalized groups of the population in the community‘s development. In 2002, there was a 
predominance of women among the leaders of neighbourhood associations, delegates and counsellors. In 
addition, most of the OPPA participants belong to lower income groups. Other groups, such as the black 
population or, manual and unskilled workers have also seen higher participation rates in the OPPA 
process (City, 2003). According to Abers (2000), who studied the profile of OPPA‘s participants, contrary 
to some expectations, the process has not given rise to the influence of an elite field of people with more 
education or income. In addition, Santos (2003) has shown that OPPA resulted in an increase in the 
provision of  basic public services. In 1999 the volume of garbage collected and the number of additional 
lights installed nearly doubled from the annual average for the period prior to the existence of OPPA 
(1985-1988). In 1996, the sewer lines in the municipality were expanded to cover 98% of households 
(from a coverage of about 50% in 1989). The World Bank (1999) also attributed to OPPA the paving of 
half of the municipality streets and the doubling in the number of students enrolled in primary and 
secondary schools.    
 
 
 
Addressing the Scarcity of Data on Local Finance  
The lack of adequate data on local finance is a widespread problem in the region. 
Only a handful of countries currently make municipal data openly available to the 
public.
90
 The lack of municipal budget data has major consequences. First, it makes 
policy analysis of the performance of the whole sector and of individual municipalities 
                                                 
88
 In El Salvador and other countries in the region, municipalities are required to undergo a full independent 
audit once a year to search for signs of corruption and misuse of public funds. This practice does not 
eliminate corruption but it goes a long way to keep it under control. 
89
 See  http://www.internationalbudget.org/ for other experiences in participatory budgeting and other 
innovations for more open and transparent budgeting practices. 
90
 See Table A.7 for the list of countries for which municipal budget data is available on a consistent basis. 
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much harder and overall less meaningful. Second, it deprives municipalities of the ability 
to introduce different forms of ―bench marking‖ competition among themselves, which 
could lead to improved efficiency and fiscal performance. The publication of municipal 
accounts also provides early signals of fiscal imbalances and other problems, allowing 
early intervention to fix these problems. Finally, the lack of easily accessible budget data 
reduces the overall level of accountability of local authorities to their citizens. For an 
example of best practice in the region see Box 8. 
 
 
Box 8: Annual Publication of Executed Budgets in Colombia  
 
Law 617 of 2000 in Colombia charges the National Planning Department (DNP) with the annual 
publication of the budget results (revenues, expenditures and financial indicators) for all departments and 
municipalities, together with an explanation of where there have been problems and where there has been 
progress. Included in these records is a detailed recording of the municipalities‘ fiscal performance and 
information on all income and expenditures during the past fiscal year. This annual publication is of high 
quality. The DNP collects annual data on revenues and expenditures, as well as the debt levels of all local 
governments. Each local government reports and certifies the accuracy of its executed budgets to the DNP 
through an automated system, the ―Sistema de Información para la Captura de la Ejecución Presupuestal 
de Departamentos y Municipios (SICEP). The DNP also receives information on debt levels from the 
Controloría General de la República (CGR). These data are regularly used by government institutions and 
nongovernmental organizations to monitor the performance of sub-national governments. The 
comparisons in performance also allow some form of benchmarking competition among local 
governments; which governments are doing relatively better and which are doing worse.    
 
 
Peru and Ecuador provide other examples of best practice in this area. In Peru, the 
Ministry of Economic and Finance manages, among many other data, budget information 
of all regions and on an easily accessible website. In Ecuador similar information is made 
available by mandate through the Organic Law of 2004 on Transparency and Access to 
Public Information (LOTAIP). In terms of the collection and dissemination of budget 
information, Brazil is ahead of the two other major federal countries in the region, 
Argentina and Mexico. Brazilian municipalities are charged with reporting their budgets 
in a standard specific format to the Ministry of Finance every year and this data is then 
published with only a twelve month year delay.  
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II.d Short-Term and Long-Term Structural Challenges 
Municipal governments in Latin America face both short-term challenges, the 
most serious being the after-effects of the ongoing global financial crisis, as well as many 
long-term structural challenges.  
 
Short term: Addressing the impact of the global crisis 
One of the important consequences of the on-going global financial crisis has 
been the serious deterioration of the fiscal position of governments around the world. The 
ability to weather this type of crisis in the past has been different for central governments 
and sub-national governments due to the fact that the latter are often extremely 
constrained in running budget deficits and borrowing. The situation is aggravated by the 
fact that many local governments in the Latin America region are quite dependent on 
central governments transfers and due to this their fiscal autonomy is more limited.   
If budgets are reduced due to revenue shortfalls, local governments will be less 
able to meet their service delivery responsibilities; there is also the danger that central 
governments may use the crisis to justify slowing down ongoing decentralization 
programs. At the same time, some countries have recognized the need to keep resources 
flowing to local governments during the crisis and therefore local governments may play 
an important role in shaping counter-cyclical policy.  
In the following paragraphs we use information about the impact of the financial 
crisis extracted from responses to a survey sent out by United Cities and Local 
Governments (UCLG) to its constituent member associations of local governments in 
Latin America and around the world during the third quarter of 2009.  
The most significant direct impact of the crisis has been on the level and 
composition of local government finances on both the revenue and expenditure sides of 
the budget. Although it is generally reasonable to expect decreases in revenues and 
expenditures in local government budgets, there is little reason to expect that they will be 
in the same proportion across all items.  
As in many other countries around the world, many municipal governments in 
Latin America have experienced reductions in own revenues. Significantly, 
municipalities in several Latin American countries have also experienced reductions in 
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the yields of specific tax shares. In particular, significant reductions in revenue sharing 
from natural resources are reported by Bolivia (20 %) and Peru (30 %). There have also 
been reductions in transfers from central governments. Mexico reports a 20% reduction 
in municipal transfers, and Nicaraguan municipalities report transfer losses of $12.5 
million.  
As in previous financial crises, capital expenditures may be cut more drastically 
than current expenditures because they are more easily interrupted or postponed. The 
responses to the UCLG survey confirm these expectations for some Latin American 
countries. Reductions in capital spending are reported in Mexico and Nicaragua. Some 
countries, however, report no decreases or even increases in local capital expenditures, in 
part due to the local participation in national counter-cyclical economic stimulus 
programs. Increases in municipal capital expenditures are expected in Brazil and 
Colombia. In addition, reductions in recurrent spending are expected in Mexico, 
Nicaragua, and Peru. But, as in the case of capital expenditures, several countries report 
increases in recurrent expenditures as part of central government stimulus packages; for 
example, Chile and Colombia. 
These results are a consequence of the crisis but also of the policies that have 
been implemented to cope with the crisis. Thus, for example, Colombia reports increases 
in expenditures despite (in fact, as a means to offset) the crisis. Another potential 
response of local governments to deteriorating revenue collections and unchanged or 
increased needs for expenditures is to introduce new taxes and fees or to increase the 
rates on existing ones. However, no country in Latin America indicates that such action 
has been taken. There are no reports either of increased borrowing by municipal 
governments in Latin American countries. 
Beyond the impacts of the crisis and measures implemented by local governments 
in response to it, some local governments in the region are taking advantage of the crisis 
to take a harder look at their systems of intergovernmental fiscal relations. For example, 
local governments in Ecuador are seeking a timelier and more frequent payment of 
transfers by the central government, while those in Bolivia are seeking the promotion of 
local economic development policies. Similarly, local governments in Mexico are 
seeking the deregulation of local government investment funds and those in Chile and 
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Colombia are seeking greater flexibility in the legal framework so that local governments 
can develop anti-cyclical policies. Municipalities in several Latin American countries 
(Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Mexico, and Peru) point out in the survey to the 
potential role played by international organizations through foreign aid for the provision 
of increased funds and better coordination in the allocation of those funds to improve 
local investments and capacity building.  
In summary, municipal governments in Latin America, like their counterparts in 
other regions of the world, are going through a financial and economic crisis of 
unprecedented depth. The crisis has affected practically all central governments in the 
region and it has also affected most local governments in some way. However, as 
indicated by the responses to the UCLG survey, there is a great variety in how local 
governments across and within different countries have fared. While some local 
governments have seen their funding cut and all types of expenditures reduced, others 
have actually experienced increases in funding and have increased certain types of 
expenditures. 
 
Long term: Structural challenges: 
Beyond the short-term issue of regaining fiscal balance, many local governments 
across the region face similar long-term structural challenges. Here we highlight three of 
these challenges.  
 
1. Strengthening tax capacity and its effective use by local governments. This will 
require looking into the entire array of local taxes including some more recent 
innovations, such as betterment levies and Brazil‘s ISS (local service tax).  But it 
would also mean making more effective use of the impuesto predial (local 
property tax).  The more effective use of property tax will require the periodic 
updating of fiscal cadastres with the reassessment of property values and putting 
more emphasis on collection efficiency through reductions in compliance costs 
and consistent use of penalties.
91
 However, there will continue to be limitations in 
                                                 
91
  See Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez (2009) for an analysis of the relative potential of property taxes in 
the Latin American region.  
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the overall level of tax capacity for many municipal governments, so there will be 
a need to continue to provide significant attention to the systems of 
intergovernmental transfers, comprising equalization transfers with unconditional 
use of funds and conditional block grants. 
2. Increasing the efficiency of public expenditures and the quality of public services, 
which will mean, among other things, containing budgetary amounts assigned to 
salary costs –and not the level of salaries themselves- and getting rid of the biased 
belief among central government officials that capital spending is always more 
desirable (efficient) than current spending, including non-wage and salary items.
92
 
3. Finding avenues to finance the large capital infrastructure deficit for municipal 
services in the region, which will require a combination of capital transfers from 
central governments, improving creditworthiness where feasible, and facilitating 
prudent borrowing by local governments through the deepening of the 
development of private credit markets in the region.  
III. Policy Recommendations 
 The analysis in the above sections has shown that the Latin America region 
contains a rich variety of experiences and many lessons, good and bad, about 
decentralization and municipal finance. This rich variety of experiences and challenges, 
sometimes quite unique,
93
 has made it difficult to draw up a cross-country analysis. 
Nevertheless, there are many common themes and challenges facing municipal 
governments in Latin America and different countries have been able to address them 
with varying degrees of success. For example, in Chile, the central government has made 
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 Several countries in the region have introduced general regulations on salary levels in their legislation. 
For example, in Brazil the share of wages and salaries in local budgets cannot exceed 65 percent of the 
municipal budget. In Chile no municipality may spend more than 35 percent of its own revenues on wages 
and salaries. Many other countries impose restrictions as to how different kinds of funds can be spent, 
typically requiring spending on capital infrastructure a certain share of their budgets. These measures can 
be seen as paternalistic and they reflect existing serious doubts about the efficacy of horizontal 
accountability mechanisms at the local level to ensure that local officials make the best choices for their 
citizens. 
93
 For example, the challenges faced by some municipalities in Colombia go beyond fiscal issues. Here, 
municipalities in the war-torn areas must face the challenge of being on the frontlines against armed actors 
such as drug traffickers, paramilitaries and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and 
many of these municipalities are encouraged to "share" their resources with these armed groups (Rubio, 
2002). 
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use of municipal governments to increase the effectiveness of social policies and has 
been able to encourage innovation and competition among them. In Colombia, central 
legislation can provide administrative flexibility, with local governments exercising 
control over staff hiring and salary decisions and at the same provide effective 
accountability mechanisms to maintain fiscally responsible decisions by local officials. In 
Honduras, a municipal association can successfully provide technical assistance and 
training to its members. Changes in the attitudes of municipal officials toward broader 
community participation in budget decisions have taken place in countries such as 
Bolivia, Brazil, and Peru.  
In this concluding section we offer some policy recommendations grouped 
according to the set of issues examined in the previous section. Nevertheless, there 
remain challenges to be addressed and it will be necessary to continue looking for new 
orientations in future research about public local finances in the region. 
III.a Recommendations on Organizational Structure: 
 Countries with problems of fragmentation and small municipalities, should 
introduce legislation and practical support for the creation of associations of 
municipalities into mancomunidades for the delivery of certain public services requiring 
a certain minimum scale. Other solutions to the problem of insufficient scale that could 
be pursued include cooperative services agreements between larger and smaller 
municipalities, and the contracting of services with private enterprises for the delivery of 
services. In addition, careful critical study and consideration should be given to the 
creation of new tiers of vertical government (for example, regional governments) as a 
solution to some of the weaknesses observed at the existing local governments. A cheaper 
more efficient solution can be strengthening through technical assistance and additional 
funding of existing governments. 
 In any case, existing potential incentives to further fragmentation should be 
removed. In particular, those countries with transfer formulas that ensure the same 
amount of funds to all municipalities independently of their size should discontinue this 
practice. Where they do not exist now, new legislation with minimum population and 
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fiscal viability requirements should be introduced to prevent any further undesirable 
fragmentation of local governments.  
Most central governments in the region, and provincial or state governments in the case 
of federal systems, should devote more time and resources to developing administrative 
capacity, especially in the case of small and rural local governments. Some of this 
assistance can be provided for example by working together with and offering support to 
municipal associations in order to give more and better technical assistance and training 
to local officials in the most cost-effective manner or by tutoring local governments 
through contracting with regional universities and colleges.  
III.b Recommendations on intergovernmental fiscal system design: 
Without clear assignments of expenditure responsibilities to local governments it 
is not possible to have an informed judgment on whether or not the level of financing of 
these governments is adequate. Most systems of intergovernmental fiscal relations in the 
region would benefit from an explicit clarification of the competencies assigned to local 
governments. First, this will require the clear identification of the exclusive 
responsibilities of local governments. Second, in the case of concurrent or shared 
responsibilities between the local and central (or intermediate level) governments, it will 
be necessary to identify which attributes of the particular competence (regulation, 
financing, and implementation) are the responsibility of the local governments and which 
are that of higher levels of  government. Having a clearer and more transparent 
assignment may mean that the assignment would have to identify responsibilities for sub-
functions concerning regulation, financing and implementation. There will be no clear 
assignments of responsibilities, especially in the case of concurrent functions, until it is 
transparent which level of government is exclusively responsible for the different sub-
functions involved. Of course, the implementation of services may be done directly by 
the local jurisdiction or this unit can make arrangements for its provision, for example by 
a private company or some other jurisdiction.    
If there are significant differences in administrative capacity among local 
governments it may be desirable to introduce temporarily two or at most three different 
packages of expenditure responsibilities that can be devolved to local governments 
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depending on their administrative capacities and over time, as capacity is acquired, 
graduate municipalities to the more complete levels of responsibility.  
It is also desirable to adopt transparent approaches to translate the assignment of  
local functional responsibilities into expenditure needs in order to have a clear idea of the 
financing requirements of local governments. 
Greater local revenue autonomy is a challenge not yet being adequately addressed 
by most countries in the region. However, there is a need to find a better balance between 
the decentralization of expenditure responsibilities and the authority to collect local taxes 
from the residents directly benefiting from local services. This will lead to more fiscally 
responsible and politically accountable forms of decentralization. Several options are 
open going forward with this agenda.  
 First, in countries that have not assigned property tax to local governments should 
do so. Property tax has several characteristics that make it ideal as a local tax.  
 Second, other taxes that should be assigned to local governments are, for 
example, vehicle taxes, business licenses, and betterment levies on real estate for 
financing basic infrastructure improvements.  
 Third, for countries that have not done so, some degree of discretion in setting tax 
rates should be granted to all local governments so that they can adjust their tax 
bases, within legislated maximum and minimum rates. Other forms of autonomy 
beyond rate setting (e.g., adjustments to the tax base or the freedom to introduce 
new taxes) are not generally desirable.  
 Fourth, coordinated efforts of local and central governments should be made to 
increase the revenue yield of property tax and other taxes assigned to local 
governments. In the case of property taxes, these should include: regularly 
updated and improved property cadastres and property value assessment 
methodologies, increased effectiveness in the collection of tax bills, and removal 
of disincentives for increases in tax effort by local governments (such as , 
reductions in transfers when more local revenues are collected).  
 Fifth, the introduction of new taxes assigned to the local level should be 
considered, including wider use of betterment levies and local business taxation, 
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such as the ICA (impuesto de industria y comercio) in Colombia or Chile‘s 
patente municipal.  
 
Going further in the direction of increasing local tax autonomy would be the 
introduction of a local piggy-back personal income tax with a flat rate collected at the 
same time as the national income tax is collected. This latter form of local tax is common, 
for example, in northern and central Europe, but it has not been tried yet in the Latin 
America region. Finally, there is a possibility of considering the introduction of 
environmental or ‗green‘ taxes enabled by national legislation on the regulation of the 
environment. This form or taxation has not taken root in many Latin American countries 
though it provides several important advantages. The first is the so-called ―double 
dividend‖ since these taxes not only collect needed revenues but also contribute to a 
cleaner environment. These taxes can also fit well in regional and local contexts. 
Potential levies in this area would include taxes on the emission of solid waste and water 
contamination.  
In those countries where revenue sharing is a major source of local finance, it 
would be desirable to un-bundle part of the revenue sharing system into separate 
transfers, including: (i) an equalization transfer with unconditional use of funds and (ii) a 
system of block conditional grants for current and capital purposes. An explicit 
unconditional equalization grant is needed to address the important and increasing 
problem of regional fiscal disparities in many countries in the region—based on 
differences in tax capacity or economic base and differences in expenditure needs due to 
geography or the structure of population. Explicit conditional grants are necessary to 
ensure national standards and objectives in the provision of important services that have 
been decentralized, such as education and health. However, despite the introduction of 
those transfers, revenue sharing is likely to remain an important source of general funding 
for local governments and a way to address vertical imbalances, especially where it is 
more difficult to devolve higher taxing powers to local governments.     
In those countries where local borrowing is not allowed, new legislation should 
introduce the possibility of responsible local borrowing. In those countries that already 
allow municipal borrowing, it would be desirable in many cases to review the current 
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status of regulations, streamlining them when necessary so that they are not overly 
restrictive. This review should also be focused on the monitoring capabilities of the 
central government (including ―floating debt‖ or budgetary arrears with official 
institutions and private suppliers, and guarantees through municipal enterprises) and the 
introduction of a credible system of penalties for lack of compliance. 
Beyond the regulation and monitoring of local borrowing, an even more important 
challenge for most countries in the region is to facilitate a significant increase in credit 
availability to local governments for responsible borrowing, especially for smaller 
municipalities. The solution may sometimes be the creation of official financial 
intermediaries or municipal banks. A large amount of information is available within 
Latin America and other regions of the world regarding the positive features of these 
institutions that should be replicated (e.g., operating with strict banking criteria) and 
those features that should be avoided (e.g., operating with less than arms‘ length distance 
from political authorities). Policies to encourage the development of private markets for 
local credit are equally, or even more, desirable. But it must be recognized that local 
credit from private sources is unlikely to develop without more revenue autonomy and 
greater transparency of local budgets.  
III.c Recommendations on budget process and transparency: 
Those countries still requiring ex-ante approval of municipal budgets by higher-
level authorities should phase out this practice and increasingly rely on local 
accountability and effectiveness of ex-post audits and the rule of law in order to keep an 
eye on the probity of local budget execution. The misappropriation or lack of proper 
appropriation of funds in a selected number of countries is a practice that needs to be 
stopped and full compliance with ex-post audit rules should be ensured. The ultimate 
effectiveness of local public expenditures will depend on the adoption of modern budget 
evaluation practices, which remains a pending assignment for most countries in the 
region. 
The low reliability on municipal finances remains an important problem in the 
Latin American region, affecting the quality of policy design and of analytical work. Best 
practice in budget transparency and data dissemination in countries such as Colombia and 
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Peru, for example, should be replicated by all countries in the region where publicly 
available data on annual budgets and other aspects of the local finances are still missing. 
An effective way to encourage and sustain good practices in budget reporting and data 
generation is to put those data to good use by, for example, providing information to 
experts and ordinary citizens on performance and by publicizing the results in order to 
create benchmark competition across jurisdictions.  
There has been continued progress over the past decade with the institutions that 
manage finances and with the practice itself of municipal finance in the Latin American 
region. Nevertheless, there is a long road ahead of us for further improving the overall 
efficiency, equity and accountability of municipal finances in the region.  
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Annex 1: Assignments of expenditures functions (C=central; R=regional; L=local) 
 
Functions Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica 
Dominican 
Republic 
Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala 
Constitution defines 
assignments 
No Yes Yes YES YES Yes YES Yes YES YES 
General 
administration 
          
Security, police C/R C R C C C C C/L NA L 
Fire protection C/R C R C L C L NA L C/L 
Civil protection C/R C R C L C C/L C/L L C 
Justice           
Civil status register C C C C C C C C L L 
Statistical office C/R C C/L C C C C C L C 
Electoral register C/R C C C C C C C L C 
Education           
Pre-school education R C/L L C L C C C L L 
Primary education R C/L L C L C C C L L 
Secondary education R C/L R C L C C C L NA 
Vocational and 
technical 
R C/L R C L C C C L NA 
Higher education C C/L C NA C C C C C NA 
Adult education R C/L R/L NA C C C C C L 
Public Health           
Health protection R C/L C/R/L NA L C C C L NA 
Primary care R C/L C/R/L C/L L C C C L NA 
Hospitals R C/L C/R/L C/L R C C C NA NA 
Social Welfare           
Kindergarten and 
nursery 
R C/L L L C C NA C L NA 
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Annex 1: Assignments of Expenditures Functions (C=central; R=regional; L=local) (continued) 
 
Functions Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica 
Dominican 
Republic 
Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala 
Family welfare 
services 
C/R C/L C/R/L L C C NA C L NA 
Welfare homes C/R C/R C/R/L NA NA C NA C L NA 
Social security C/R C C C/L C NA C C NA NA 
Housing and town 
planning 
          
Housing L C/L C/L L C/L C C L L L 
Town planning L L C/L L L C L L L L 
Regional/spatial 
planning 
R C/L C/L R C/R NA NA L L NA 
Environment, 
sanitation 
          
Water & sewage R C/R/L L L R/L C/R C L L L 
Refuse collection & 
disposal 
R C/R/L L L L L L L L L 
Cemeteries & 
crematoria 
R C/R/L L L L L L L L L 
Slaughterhouses R C/R/L L L L L L L L L 
Environmental 
protection 
R C/L C/L L R/L C/R C/L L L L 
Consumer protection C C L NA C C NA NA L NA 
Culture, leisure & 
sports 
          
Theatres & concerts NA C/R/L R/L NA L L C NA L L 
Museums & libraries NA C/R/L C/R/L NA L C C NA L L 
Parks & open spaces NA C/R/L C/R/L L L C\L L NA L L 
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Annex 1: Assignments of Expenditures Functions (C=central; R=regional; L=local) (continued) 
 
Functions Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia 
Costa Rica Dominican 
Republic 
Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala 
Sports & leisure NA C/R/L C/R/L L L NA C/L NA L L 
Religious facilities NA C/R/L C/R/L NA NA NA NA NA L NA 
Other cultural 
facilities 
NA C/R/L C/R/L L NA NA NA NA L NA 
Traffic, transport           
Roads C/R/L C C L C/R/L C/L C R/L NA C/L 
Transport C/R C C/L L C/L NA C/L R/L NA L 
Urban road transport C/R/L C L L L C/L C/L R/L NA L 
Urban rail transport C C C NA L NA NA NA NA NA 
Ports C C C NA C/L C C NA NA NA 
Airports C C C NA C/L C C NA NA NA 
Utilities           
Gas R C C NA C/L NA NA NA L NA 
District heating R C C NA NA NA NA NA L NA 
Electricity R R C/R/L NA C/L C C NA L NA 
Water supply  R R/L NA R/L C C L L L 
Economic           
Agriculture, forests, 
fishing 
C/R C/R/L C/L NA C/L C C L L NA 
Economic promotion C/R C/R/L C/L NA C/R/L C C/L L L NA 
Trade & industry C/R C/R/L C/L NA C/L C C L L NA 
Tourism C/R C/R/L C/L NA C/R/L C C NA L NA 
Other economic 
services 
NA C/R/L C/L NA L C NA NA NA NA 
Employment NA C/R/L C/L L C/L C C NA NA NA 
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Annex 1: Assignments of Expenditures Functions (C=central; R=regional; L=local) (continued) 
 
Functions Honduras Jamaica Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela 
Constitution defines 
assignments 
YES No No Yes   YES Yes Yes 
General 
administration 
         
Security, police L C C/R/L c   C/L C C/R/L 
Fire protection L L L c   L C C/R/L 
Civil protection L C C/R/L    C/R/L C C/L 
Justice          
Civil status register L C R/L L   C/L C L 
Statistical office L C C/R/L    C C C 
Electoral register L C C    C C C 
Education          
Pre-school education C/L L C/R/L    C/R C/L C/R/L 
Primary education C/L L C/R/L    C/R C/L C/R/L 
Secondary education C L C/R/L    C/R C C/R/L 
Vocational and technical C C C/R    C/R  C/R/L 
Higher education C C C/R    C/R C C 
Adult education C C R    C/R  C 
Public Health          
Health protection C/L L C/R    C/R C/L C/R/L 
Primary care C/L L C/R/L C/L   C/R C L 
Hospitals C/L C/L C/R    C/R C C/R 
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Annex 1 Assignments of Expenditures Functions (C=central; R=regional; L=local) (continued) 
 
Functions Honduras Jamaica Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela 
Social Welfare          
Kindergarten and 
nursery 
NA C C/R     C C/R/L 
Family welfare services NA C/L C    C/L C C/R/L 
Welfare homes NA C C/R    L C C/R/L 
Social security NA C C     C C 
Housing and town 
planning 
         
Housing L C L L   C L C 
Town planning L C/L L L   L L L 
Regional/spatial 
planning 
L C/L R    R L R/L 
Environment, 
sanitation 
         
Water & sewage L C/L R/L L   C/R/L L L 
Refuse collection & 
disposal 
L C/L L L   L L C/L 
Cemeteries & 
crematoria 
L na L L   L L L 
Slaughterhouses L na L L   L L L 
Environmental 
protection 
L C C/R/L L   C/R/L L C/L 
Consumer protection L C C/R/L    C  C 
Culture, leisure & 
sports 
         
Theatres & concerts L na R/L    C/L L C/R/L 
Museums & libraries L na R/L L   C/L L C/R/L 
Parks & open spaces L C/L L L   L L R/L 
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Annex 1: Assignments of Expenditures Functions (C=central; R=regional; L=local) (continued) 
 
Functions Honduras Jamaica Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela 
Sports & leisure L C/L C/R/L L   L C/L C/R/L 
Religious facilities L na C L   L   
Other cultural facilities L C/L C/R/L L   L L  
Traffic, transport          
Roads L C/L L C/L   C/R/L L C/R/L 
Transport L C/L C/R C/L   C/R/L L C/R/L 
Urban road transport L C/L R/L C/L   L L L 
Urban rail transport C C/L L      L 
Ports C C C L   R  C/R 
Airports C C C    C  C/R 
Utilities          
Gas L C     C L C/L 
District heating L C      L  
Electricity L C L L   C/R/L C/L C/L 
Water supply L C L L   C/R/L L C/L 
Economic          
Agriculture, forests, 
fishing 
L C C    C/R L C 
Economic promotion L C C/R/L    C/R L C/R/L 
Trade & industry L C C/R    C/R L C/R/L 
Tourism L C C/R L   C/R L L 
Other economic services L C C/R/L      C/R/L 
Employment L C C/R/L      C 
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Annex 1: Revenues and Expenditures by Government Level (in millions of dollars) 
 
Country (Most 
recent year) 
Revenues Expenditures Revenues (% total) Expenditures (% total) 
Federal 
/ 
central Regional Local 
Federal 
/ 
central Regional Local 
Federal 
/ 
central Regional Local 
Federal 
/ 
central Regional Local 
Argentina(2006) 81,428 56,207 11,050 26,190 15,093 3,107 55% 38% 7% 59% 34% 7% 
Bolivia(2008) 4,298 743 957 3,962 660 880 72% 12% 16% 72% 12% 16% 
Brazil(2007) 347,330 187,482 113,905 314,445  174,513  112,332  54% 29% 18% 52% 29% 19% 
Chile(2007) 23,533 na 2,307 22,876 na 3,119 91%   9% 88%   12% 
Colombia(2006) 57,134 12,567 20,208 32,432 5,809 10,165 64% 14% 22% 67% 12% 21% 
Dominican 
Republic(2006) na na na na na na             
Ecuador(2007) 8,177  na  1,133 7,934 na 2,423 88%   12% 77%   23% 
El 
Salvador(2007) 2,973  na   na  3,602 na 108 100%     97%   3% 
Guatemala(2002) 4,621  na   na  5,174 na na 100%     100%     
Haiti(2004) 1,050  na   na  802 na na 100%     100%     
Honduras(2004) 37,145  n.a  3,096 1,788 na 195 92%   8% 90%   10% 
Jamaica(2008) na  na  1,233 4,188 na 73 100%    98%   2% 
Mexico(2007) 248,578 89,412 20,484 226,301 81,993 19,678 69% 25% 6% 69% 25% 6% 
Nicaragua(2002)  n.a   n.a   n.a  na na na             
Panama(2005) 3,107  na  59.74 6,718 na 137 98%   2% 98%   2% 
Paraguay(2006) 10,943  na  898 4,868 na 423 92%   8% 92%   8% 
Peru(2007) 13,984 3,313 3,703 11,087 3,043 2,774 67% 16% 18% 66% 18% 16% 
Trinidad and 
Tobago(1995)  n.a   n.a   na  8,600 na na             
Uruguay(2007)  n.a   na   na  8,611 na na       100%     
Venezuela(2007) 65,736  na  177 58,515 na 373 100%     99%   1% 
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Table Annexe.2: Origin of Revenues of Local Governments (millions US$) 
 
Country  (Most recent year) 
Own taxes 
and Fees 
Shared 
revenues 
Conditional 
Transfers 
Unconditional 
transfers/Aid 
Own 
taxes and 
fees  (% 
of the 
total) 
Shared 
revenues 
(% of the 
total) 
Conditional 
Transfers 
Unconditional 
transfers/Aid 
Own 
taxes 
and 
fees 
Shared 
revenues 
(% of 
GDP) 
Conditional 
Transfers 
(% of GDP) 
Unconditional 
transfers/Aid 
(% of GDP) 
(% of the 
total) (% of the total) 
(% of 
GDP) 
Argentina(2006) 5,502.90 4,685.20 na 861.9 49.80% 42.40% 0.00% 7.80% 1.22% 1.04% 0.00% 0.19% 
Bolivia(2008) 165024 478203 268625 4,571.00 11.40% 17.20% 0.00% 71.40% 2.65% 4.01% 0.00% 16.63% 
Brazil(2007) 22,746.19 87,345.70 na 3,856.38 20.10% 76.50% 0.00% 3.40% 1.75% 6.67% 0.00% 0.29% 
Chile(2007) 1,453.41 na na 853.59 63.00% 0.00% 0.00% 37.00% 0.66% 0.00% 0.00% 0.39% 
Colombia(2006) 8,325.70 na 11882.304  41.20% 0.00% 58.80% 0.00% 2.11% 0.00% 3.02% 0.00% 
Dominican Republic(2006) na na na na 58.40% 10.40% 31.20% 0.00% 0.69% 0.12% 0.37% 0.00% 
Ecuador(2007) 392.02 0.00 0 740.982 34.60% 0.00% 0.00% 65.40% 1.62% 0.00% 0.00% 3.07% 
El Salvador (2007) 
na na Na na 
69.90% 0.00% 0.00% 30.10% 0.00% 2.07% 0.00% 3.51% 
Guatemala(2002) 
na na Na na 
25.00% 5.00% 60.00% 10.00% 0.53% 0.11% 1.28% 0.21% 
Honduras(2004) 1,798.78 340.56 185.76 770.904 58.10% 11.00% 6.00% 24.90% 0.95% 0.18% 0.10% 0.41% 
Jamaica(2008) 1,233.00 0.00 0 0 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.16% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Mexico(2007) 3,195.50 9,279.25 0 8009.244 15.60% 45.30% 0.00% 39.10% 2.38% 6.91% 0.00% 5.98% 
Nicaragua(2002) 
na na Na na 
44.00% 5.00% 11.00% 40.00% 0.56% 0.06% 0.14% 0.51% 
Panama(2005) 29.27 27.54 2.92726 0 49.00% 46.10% 4.90% 0.00% 0.33% 0.31% 0.03% 0.00% 
Paraguay(2006) 306.22 16.16 96.984 478.634 34.10% 1.80% 10.80% 53.30% 1.23% 0.07% 0.39% 1.91% 
Peru(2007) 1,599.70 1,788.55 0 314.755 43.20% 48.30% 0.00% 8.50% 2.62% 2.92% 0.00% 0.52% 
Venezuela(2007) 167.97 0.00 9.027 0 94.90% 0.00% 5.10% 0.00% 0.07% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
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